Features

Setting the Record Straight Regarding Lieutenants White and McCullin, Tuskegee Airmen
Joseph D. Caver, Jerome A. Ennels, and Wesley Phillips Newton

The Air National Guard and the War on Drugs: Non-State Actors before 9/11
Alan D. Meyer and David P. Anderson

A Mission of Vengeance: Vichy French in Indochina in World War II
Martin L. Michelsen

Operation Vittles: A Name for the Berlin Airlift
Roger G. Miller

Book Reviews

Understanding Victory and Defeat in Contemporary War
Ed. by Jan Angstrom and Isabelle Duyvesteyn Reviewed by Stéphane Lefebvre

War Bird Ace: The Great War Exploits of Capt. Field E. Kindley
By Jack Stokes Ballard Reviewed by Herman Reinhold

Vulcan Test Pilot: My Experiences in the Cockpit of a Cold War Icon.
By Tony Blackman. Reviewed by Stetson M. Siler

Supersonic Thunder: A Novel of the Jet Age
By Walter J. Boyne Reviewed by Joe McCue

The Luftwaffe over Germany: Defense of the Reich
By Donald Caldwell and Richard Muller Reviewed by David J. Schepp

Flight of the Intruder
By Stephen Coonts Reviewed by Herman Reinhold

Sinking the Rising Sun: Dog Fighting & Dive Bombing in World War II: A Navy Fighter Pilot's Story
By William E. Davis Reviewed by Phil Webb

Barbarossa and the Retreat to Moscow: Recollections of Fighter Pilots on the Eastern Front
By Artem Drabkin Reviewed by Daniel J. Simonsen

By Francis French and Colin Burgess. Reviewed by Grant T. Weller

Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan
By Tsuyoshi Hasegawa Reviewed by Scott A. Willey

War on Two Fronts: An Infantry Commander's War in Iraq and the Pentagon
By Christopher Hughes Reviewed by Brett Morris

Talking to the Enemy: Track Two Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia.
By Dalia Dassa Kaye Reviewed by Brett Morris

The War Managers: Thirtieth Anniversary Edition
By Douglas Kinnard. Reviewed by Curtis H. O'Sullivan

So Others May Live: Saving Lives, Defying Death with the Coast Guard's Rescue Swimmers
By Martha J. LaGuardia-Kotite Reviewed by Darrel Whitcomb

By Douglas Mudgway. Reviewed by James Schier

The Effectiveness of Airpower in the 20th Century: Part One (1914-1939)
By Captain John F. O'Connell

The Effectiveness of Airpower in the 20th Century: Part Two (1939-1945)
By Captain John F. O'Connell and reviewed by Scott A. Willey

Les Matériaux de l'Armée de l'Aire #4: P–47 Thunderbolt Français
By Guilleman Sébastien Reviewed by Daniel J. Simonsen

The Battle of Ap Bac: They Did Everything But Learn from It
By David M. Toczek Reviewed by John L. Cirafici

Departments

Books Received and The President's Message

Reader's Note: John L. Martin and David V. Miller

Letters, News, Reunions, & In Memoriam

History Mystery

COVER: The painting “9-11” by Gil Cohen depicts an Air National Guard fighter providing combat air patrol over the nation's capital. (Image used with permission of the National Guard Bureau.)
On July 2, 1943, forty-eight P–40 Warhawks, of the 99th Fighter Squadron, escorted a dozen B–25 Mitchells en route to bomb a Luftwaffe air base in Sicily. The mission succeeded as the bombers got through to their targets and Lt. Charles Hall became the first Tuskegee Airman to shoot down a German plane. But the day was spoiled when the 99th also learned they had lost two of its fighter pilots. A postwar account of the event recorded that the two pilots, Lieutenants White and McCullin, had crashed on takeoff. This report went unchallenged for more than sixty years. In the lead article historians Joseph Caver, Jerome Ennels, and Wesley Newton have dug into the historical record to set the story straight.

In the second article, Air National Guard historians Alan Meyer and David Anderson seek precedents for the “9/11” 2001 terrorist attack against the United States. They focus on four case studies in the U.S. war on drugs involving non-state actors. Meyer and Anderson conclude that the past can indeed inform the future—provided we find the right places to look.

It is well known that when the “Japanese Octopus” conquered the Far East in World War II, French Indo-China emerged as an important target of Allied air power. Less well known is the role of the colonial governor-general there. Appointed by France’s Vichy government, Vice Admiral Jean Decoux became a willing collaborator. Professor Martin Mickelsen holds Decoux responsible for the torture and death of many Allied airmen he turned over to the Japanese.

The fourth article, written by Roger Miller, an expert on the Berlin airlift and a frequent contributor to Air Power History, traces the origin and rationale of the name “Operation Vittles.” A superb and tenacious researcher, Miller demonstrates the value sometime inherent in answering a seemingly trivial question.

Don’t miss the “Readers’ Note—Section 4 Officers” [page 71] by Generals Martin and Miller. Note that a great percentage of the advanced flight officers in the Class of 41B attained general officer rank.

Lt. Gen. Michael A. Nelson, President of the Air Force Historical Foundation, provides the latest news concerning the Foundation and announces the Annual Awards Banquet scheduled for October 6, 2008. For details, see pages 68 and following to find out about the event and the names of the award winners.

Interested in the latest literature on air power history? See the book review section beginning on page 56 and the books received list on page 66. Our customary departments follow.

From the Editor

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SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT REGARDING LIEUTENANTS WHITE AND McCULLIN, TUSKEGEE AIRMEN
African-American flyers fought two battles in World War II: one against a foreign enemy and another against a domestic enemy—racial prejudice. The latter highlighted a bitter irony about the United States’ role in what some cynically called the “Good War.” Namely, a nation fighting for the cause of democracy against totalitarian forces, while its own armed forces were racially segregated with large numbers in their ranks and treated as inferiors. This unfortunate situation reflected much of the nation’s society. The Tuskegee Airmen ultimately triumphed against both enemies. This victory paralleled the story of the equally gallant and courageous Japanese-American U.S. Army infantry 442d Combat Team of World War II.¹

The story of the Tuskegee Airmen has been told by historians, biographers, and in memoirs of several Tuskegee Airmen themselves. Unfortunately, an error committed by some historians has marred the telling. This flaw—that has persisted to the present day—concerns the fate of two of the Tuskegee Airmen, 1st Lt. Sherman H. White, Jr. and 2d Lt. James L. McCullin.

When flight training commenced for the first of the Army Air Forces (AAF) African-American avia-

(Aoverleaf) Three aviation cadets report to their instructor pilot at Tuskegee Army Air Field, Ala., in front of a line of Vultee B–13 aircraft. The instructor would take each cadet, in turn, aloft for individual flying instruction. (All photos courtesy of the authors.)
ticipate in the North African Campaign; Allied forces inflicted the final defeat on the Axis forces before the 99th was ready for combat. In June 1943, pilots of the 99th took off on their initial combat missions. The squadron, along with other Allied air units, flew in support of the Allied assault on the Axis-held islands of Pantelleria and Sicily, "stepping stones" across the Mediterranean leading to Italy. The 99th was based on an airfield at Ferdjourn, Tunisia. It was equipped with Curtiss P–40 Warhawks, obsolete aircraft compared to the standard Bf 109s and FW-190s flown by the Luftwaffe.5

The official squadron history, written monthly by the squadron's intelligence officer, reported the combat missions of June 1943: "Our pilots had their first mission on June 2, 1943. They did not encounter the enemy on this mission.... Pilots of the 99th Fighter Squadron had an average of two missions daily from June 2 to June 9, 1943. The missions were varied; some were to bomb gun positions on Pantelleria Island, others to serve as escorts for A–20s and B–25s." On June 9, pilots of the 99th had their first sighting of airborne German fighters, while escorting A–20 light bombers over Pantelleria. The enemy fled before any contact was made and Allied forces took the island on June 11. The rest of June was "comparatively quiet" for 99th pilots. One exception was on June 18, when in a dogfight between P–40s and Bf 109s, 1st Lt. Lee Rayford's Warhawk took hits on the right wing, becoming the first 99th Squadron aircraft to be damaged by enemy fighter fire. Rayford made it safely back to base. Late in June, King George of Great Britain reviewed 50 enlisted men of the 99th.6

1st Lt. Sherman White and 2d Lt. James McCullin had taken part in the squadron's combat operations in June. White was from a middle class family. His parents were grammar school teachers in Elmore County, Alabama, who prized education for their children. White was a student at the University of Chicago in 1941, when he learned the Army was training young blacks as military aviators in Tuskegee. He applied to be an aviation cadet, passed the physical and mental exams, and was on his way to Tuskegee. While in training, he persuaded his parents to move from Elmore County to Montgomery, where the family had once lived. Sherman, Jr. promised his family when he became a commissioned officer he would make the payments on their newly-acquired house in Montgomery. The city became his legal residence.

James McCullin had a similar background to White's. A resident of St. Louis, he was a student at Kentucky State University, a state institution for blacks, when he learned of the flight training at Tuskegee. Like White, he too was intelligent and easily passed the requisite exams to become an aviation cadet.7

On the morning of July 2, 1943, White and McCullin were part of a 48-plane escort for 12 AAF B–25s outward bound to bomb a Luftwaffe base in Sicily. Near the coast of Sicily, German fighters swarmed to attack the bomber formation. It would prove to be the most eventful encounter yet with enemy fighters for 99th pilots. 1st Lt. Charles B. Hall of Brazil, Indiana, shot down an FW-190, the first enemy fighter downed by a 99th pilot. The escorting airmen kept the Luftwaffe planes away from B–25s, which were able to drop their bombs on the enemy airfield. But when the P–40s returned to their Tunisian base, two of their number were gone.8

The missing planes were those of White and McCullin. Despite a visit to their base by Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower heading a group that included Generals Jimmy Doolittle and Carl Spaatz on the afternoon of July 2, anxiety for the missing pilots lingered. On July 3, a Royal Air Force plane searched the area of the sea from the point of the attacks by enemy fighters to the coast of Sicily, but its pilot saw no evidence of any downed aircraft or pilots. A war correspondent for
The newspaper *Baltimore Afro-American*, who was at the 99th's Tunisian base at the time, sent a report to his newspaper, after interviewing surviving pilots of the mission, including the squadron commander Lt. Col. Benjamin O. Davis, Jr. Concerning White and McCullin, it read, “they did not have time to jump. One day they were eating and playing games and talking of postwar plans back home—then they went on a mission—and never came back.”

A week after the July 2 mission, the families of the missing pilots each received a Missing-in-Action telegram from the War Department. Several weeks later came the dreaded telegram that read, “The War Department regrets to inform you …” No trace of White, McCullin, or their aircraft ever surfaced, neither from the sea, an enemy prisoner of war (POW) camp, nor anywhere else. Ultimately, as the war wound down, the families of both men hung in a front window of their homes a small blue banner with a gold star, signifying they had a member of the armed forces killed in the war.9

The 99th Fighter Squadron went on to distinguish itself in air campaigns in which it mainly provided escort (as a part of the 332d Fighter Group) for AAF heavy bombers that attacked enemy targets in Axis controlled Europe. In so doing, it proved that African-American airmen were as capable as any other racial group in the U.S. armed forces. The performance of the Tuskegee Airmen, the heroism of its individuals, their persistence in the face of awareness that at home they were treated as second-class citizens contributed to a post-war dividend of the highest order.

The United States Air Force was the first service to integrate racially, and the successes of the Tuskegee Airmen during World War II were a major factor in the decision to integrate. The climax of the recognition of their persistence and heroism came sixty years later, in 2007, when surviving members of the Tuskegee Airmen received the Congressional Gold Medal from President George W. Bush. Sherman White, Jr., James L. McCullin, and other Tuskegee Airmen who died in World War II, and those who have died since could only be there in spirit at the ceremony awarding the Congressional Gold Medal to all of the Tuskegee Airmen.10

An incident in which Sherman White's parents were involved illustrated how far African-American service men and women and veterans of the armed forces have come at the recent triumphant day when the Gold Medals were conferred. In the spring of 1946, several months after the end of World War II, the Montgomery, Alabama, all-white Civitan Club placed a marble cenotaph in an open space in the downtown area in front of a building containing the federal court house and the post office where several streets converged to form a square. The cenotaph was to honor all military personnel from Montgomery County who had died in the war. White's parents, Sherman, Sr. and Nettie White, received written invitations from the Civitan Club to attend the ceremony dedicating the cenotaph.

On the day of the dedication ceremony, traffic was blocked off and chairs arranged around the cenotaph for the next-of-kin of the dead. Sherman,
Sr. would later describe in a letter to The Montgomery Advertiser what transpired when he and his wife arrived for the ceremony: “When I presented this [invitation] and it was ascertained that I was a Negro I was refused a seat and was told that I would have to stand. We did not choose to stand.” They left before the ceremony began. Some weeks later, a Civitan leader made a private apology to the Whites, but there was never a public apology.11

After World War II, the general public in the United States gradually became aware of what the Tuskegee Airmen had accomplished and what they represented. The veterans themselves formed a Tuskegee Airmen Association, which held annual meetings. Individual Tuskegee Airmen began to write memoirs. And the careers of two of the Tuskegee Airmen were followed closely in the national media. Daniel “Chappie” James—who did not serve overseas in World War II but distinguished himself as a U. S. Air Force fighter pilot in the Korean Conflict and Vietnam—eventually rose to become the first black four-star general in the history of the U. S. armed forces. Benjamin O. Davis, Jr. also rose to high rank. He was the first black Air Force officer to attend the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base’s prestigious Air University in Montgomery, Alabama. He retired as a three-star general. Later President Bill Clinton pinned a fourth star on him.12

Francis did not cite a source for this claim. Had it not been repeated in subsequent histories, and in a nationally televised program on the Tuskegee Airmen, the truth of what actually happened on July 2, 1943, to White and McCullin might not have become so distorted. A major example of such a distortion was in a book by a white professional historian, Stanley Sandler. The book, Segregated Skies, published in 1992 by the prestigious Smithsonian Institution Press, also states that White and McCullin died in a takeoff collision. It is likely that Francis was Sandler’s source. Sandler’s book is an otherwise well-written and well-researched account of the combat record in World War II of the Tuskegee Airmen.14

In the summer of 2005, the error was repeated on a television Channel Fox News program called “War Stories.” Aired each week on Sunday night and narrated by Oliver North, “War Stories” devoted one week’s program to the Tuskegee Airmen. And it repeated the deaths-by-collision on
takeoff account. The error occurred despite the fact that the producers of the program were furnished in advance documentary evidence of the true account by historians at the Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) at Maxwell Air Force Base, archives that contain the largest collection of source material on the history of the U.S. Air Force and its predecessors.15

Tuskegee Airmen Samuel L. Broadnax in Blue Skies, Black Wings: African American Pioneers of Aviation, published by Praeger Press in 2006, claims on p.131, that “Lieutenants James McCullin and Sherman White lost their lives in a mid-air collision near the coast of Sicily.” At least Broadnax states that the supposed accident occurred while White and McCullin were in the air during the mission of July 2, 1943.16

Evidence of how White and McCullin really died is available from various sources. Several Tuskegee Airmen, in their memoirs, describe what actually happened. In his autobiography Benjamin O. Davis, Jr: American, published by the Smithsonian Institution Press in 1991, Davis relates on July 2, 1943, he led his squadron’s fighter planes that escorted “12 B–25s to Castelvetrano in southwest Sicily. It was on this mission that I saw my
NOTES

1. African-American servicemen fought in the European-Mediterranean Theaters and the Pacific Theaters, but the Japanese-American servicemen were confined to the European Theater.


5. “Sq. 99, HI (FTR), 1 Nov 1941-17 Sep 1943,” p. 7, Archives, AFHRA.

6. Ibid.


8. “Sq. 99, HI (FTR), 1 Nov 1941-17 Sep 1943,” p. 7, Archives, AFHRA.


17. Davis, Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., p. 100.


The Air National Guard and the War on Drugs: Non-State Actors before 9/11
n the morning of September 11, 2001, members of the radical Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda hijacked four U.S. airliners with the intention of crashing the fully-loaded passenger jets into high-profile targets. Air National Guard (ANG) fighter planes—Massachusetts ANG F–15s from Otis ANG Base, South Dakota ANG F–16s based at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, and Washington, D.C. ANG F–16s from Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland—scrambled to intercept the hijacked aircraft. Unfortunately, they arrived too late to prevent two of the airliners from destroying New York City’s World Trade Center and a third from severely damaging one section of the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. The fourth plane crashed in a Pennsylvania field when passengers attempted to battle the hijackers.1

Within hours, 34 ANG fighter units across the nation were ready to fly combat missions. And, in the first 24 hours alone, 15 of those units flew 179 fighter missions to provide combat air patrols (CAP) over major U.S. cities. Air Guard tanker, airlift, and rescue units flew scores of sorties on September 11, as well. Meanwhile on that terrible day, hundreds of other Air Guardsmen including personnel from chaplain services, civil engineers, security forces, and medical units volunteered for duty. In the first five years since September 11, 2001, more than 55,000 ANG citizen-airmen volunteered or were called up to fight terrorism at home and abroad in locations ranging from Afghanistan to Iraq to the Horn of Africa.2

The “9/11” terrorist attacks spotlighted the relationship between U.S. national security and so-called “non-state actors,” like al-Qaeda. On television and radio, in print and online, politicians and pundits argued that military leaders and civilian officials could no longer limit their strategic policies and plans to individual nations and multinational alliances that threatened U.S. interests. Many experts implied and some declared that this new focus on non-state actors represented a major revolution in military and political thinking.3

This viewpoint, however, overlooks the historical record. The U.S. military had confronted non-state actor adversaries long before 9/11. Studying this rich and varied background can provide leaders, planners, and analysts a broader perspective and an invaluable context that may help them better to understand the present and shape the future.

This article briefly explores four instances involving the use of U.S. air power—specifically, the Air National Guard—to engage non-state actors both at home and abroad prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. These case studies, drawn from America’s decades-long war on drugs, include two long-term overseas counternarcotics undertakings, a domestic National Guard Bureau counterdrug program conducted in conjunction with civilian law enforcement agencies, and a series of overseas military engineering and medical civic assistance exercises intended to promote host nation and regional stability.

At first glance, there may seem scant similarity between America’s long-running war on drugs and the more recent “War on Terror” declared by President George W. Bush. Indeed, despite the fact that some terror groups have started to use the illicit drug trade to fund other operations, the authors do not attempt to draw direct comparisons between these two endeavors. Broadly speaking, profit-motivated drug lords are not interchangeable with jihadist al-Qaeda leaders. And most narco-traffickers, the “mules” who transport drugs across international borders, and the local dealers who sell to users on the street, bear little comparison with the terrorists and foot soldiers of anti-western extremist groups. Yet, both the war on terror and the war on drugs are responses to long-term threats to America. Moreover, unlike most military conflicts facing the nation since the American Civil War, the battlegrounds for these two wars are found abroad and at home. They share at least one other feature, as well. As these pre-9/11 case studies from the war on drugs reveal, both conflicts involve the United States and its allies facing off against “non-state actors.” Thus,
Defining the Non-State Actor

For a term that enjoys such widespread use today, defining “non-state actor” proves more difficult than one might expect. Many authors, including those of several U.S. national policy documents, employ the expression without bothering to explain what it means.4 The same is true of several key Joint Publications (JP) that describe current U.S. military doctrine. For example, JP 2.0 (Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations), JP 3.0 (Joint Operations), and JP 3-26 (Homeland Security) all list non-state actors as serious potential threats to U.S. national security, but none provide a definition.5 This implies either that the term is so commonplace that no definition is required, or that its meanings are so varied and amorphous that it is actually difficult to define. A quick check online suggests that the latter may be the case. For instance, the first hit on a GoogleTM search provided this vastly oversimplified, and thus essentially useless, definition: “Non-state actors, in international relations, are actors on the international level which are not states.”6 Fortunately, the same site goes on to list what can take considerable effort to piece together from various official—and up-to-date—government sources:

- non-state actors include international paramilitary and terrorist groups; international organized crime and drug trafficking groups; non-governmental organizations (NGOs); multi-national corporations; the international media; and transnational diaspora communities.7

Thus, by these and other current definitions, those who produce, transport, or sell illicit drugs clearly count among the legions of modern-day non-state actors.

Background: America’s War on Drugs

By the early 1980s, illicit drug use in the United States had reached epidemic proportions. Drug trafficking, drug abuse, and drug-related crime placed an enormous drain on the national economy; most Americans viewed drugs as a threat to the very fabric of modern society. At the international level, the illicit drug trade jeopardized U.S. foreign relations with governments in Central and South America. Drug cartels and their leaders, the “drug lords,” had grown so wealthy, powerful, and bold that they could threaten legitimate national governments in Latin America. At the same time, terrorist groups with political or ideological agendas—in particular, the Peru-based Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and the “Movimiento 19 de Abril” (also known as M-19) in Colombia—exploited the cocaine trade to fund their war against the governments of those countries.8

In response to the growing drug-related problems at home and abroad, President Ronald Reagan, on January 30, 1982, officially declared a “War on Drugs” to combat drug-smuggling operations. What began that year with the South Florida Task Force eventually grew into the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS). Directed by then-Vice President George H.W. Bush, the NNBIS was responsible for coordinating all federal counterdrug efforts.9 The Department of Defense (DoD) initially resisted becoming involved in counterdrug operations. First, DoD leaders feared that a new mission would diminish military readiness at a time when the Soviet Union remained a significant military threat. Second, there was a longstanding tradition—dating to the early days of the American Republic—of the military resisting any involvement in civil law enforcement matters.10

This tradition had been codified into law through the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which expressly prohibited the U.S. military from providing certain types of assistance to civil authorities without first obtaining Presidential approval, and made violations of this law a felony. Over time, this law was interpreted to include members of all active duty, Reserve, and National Guard forces (with the exception of special law enforcement provisions for the U.S. Coast Guard). In 1982, however, Congress made significant changes regarding how the military could support counterdrug operations. Public Law 97-86 amended the Posse Comitatus Act by authorizing indirect involvement by any component of the U.S. military to assist civilian law enforcement agencies. This could include equipment loans, personnel support, training, and the sharing of information. There were still several caveats. This “indirect support” could not be a primary mission; instead it either had to provide equivalent military training for the units involved or else be accomplished in addition to required training missions. Furthermore, the law directed that this indirect support could not degrade unit combat readiness or the DoD’s capacity to fulfill its national defense mission.11

These changes to the Posse Comitatus Act cleared the way for increased military involvement in counterdrug operations. By late 1988, the DoD was named the lead agency for detecting and monitoring illegal drug traffic into the United States. Then in September of 1989, President George H.W. Bush unveiled a National Drug Control Strategy that outlined his proposed policies for dealing with the problem. That same month, and in keeping with the President’s intent, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney stated that counterdrug operations were now a part of DoD national security priorities. In short, the U.S. military had joined the war on drugs.12

Overseas Counter-Narcotics Missions: Operation “Coronet Nighthawk”

In 1990, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) determined that its counterdrug mission
required a high-speed, covert method to intercept, identify, and shadow civilian aircraft suspected of transporting narcotics within the transit zone between Latin America, the Caribbean, and the United States. This, in turn, led to the creation of Operation Coronet Nighthawk, which employed ANG fighter aircraft and personnel to support the detection and monitoring mission assigned to U.S. Southern Air Forces (SOUTHAF, also known as the Twelfth Air Force) and other agencies involved with counterdrug efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean. Ultimately, this ANG operation lasted for more than a decade before it was discontinued shortly before the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001.13

Coronet Nighthawk deployed Air Guard fighter units on six-week rotations to provide continuous coverage in the region. Each deployment package included five aircraft and 41 personnel (all of whom volunteered for the mission). In keeping with the standard National Guard two-week annual training requirement, most of these personnel rotated every two weeks, while the unit’s aircraft remained at Howard Air Base (AB) in Panama for the entire six-week duration. When Howard AB closed in April 1999, SOUTHCOM relocated the Coronet Nighthawk mission to Hato International Airport on Curaçao in the Netherlands Antilles. The United States chose this 171-square mile coral island, located less than 50 miles north of Venezuela, as the new base of operations in part because it lay in the path of the most direct route for narcotics traffic from Latin America to Haiti and the Dominican Republic, which were considered key stepping stones for smuggling drugs to the United States. While deployed, the ANG fighter units maintained a 15-minute aircraft alert posture 24 hours per day.14

Requirements for Air Guard fighter units supporting the counterdrug mission centered on the capability to quickly intercept, then shadow and identify an aircraft or boat suspected of carrying illegal drug shipments. The fighters flew only unarmed patrols over international waters, never entering another country’s airspace. In addition, they did not attack, nor attempt to force down, any aircraft suspected of carrying illegal drug shipments. Instead, various agencies used information collected by Air Guard fighters to interdict suspicious aircraft and boats at their destinations and to predict patterns for future counter-smuggling efforts. This information also assisted Latin American and Caribbean nations in finding and destroying drug labs and drug-carrying aircraft on the ground within their borders. Although direct proof that Air Guard fighter patrols denied drug smugglers direct access across the Caribbean from Colombia and Venezuela to Haiti and the Dominican Republic is scarce, these
mission did successfully identify and track numerous aircraft and boats suspected of carrying illegal drugs and almost certainly forced the drug lords to find alternate means and methods to transport their products to the United States.  

The Joint Interagency Task Force—East (JIATF-E), which was based in Key West, Florida and responsible for coordinating military counterdrug operations within the transit zone, scheduled three ANG counterdrug patrols per day.  

The last launch of the day always a night mission. All missions—day or night—were flown in two-ship flights. Pilots flew day sorties in “high-fast flier” (high-altitude, high-speed intercept) profile when approaching likely targets spotted by airborne and ground-based radars, then employed daytime Visual Identification (VID) techniques to detect and describe suspect ships, boats, and aircraft. Night sorties required pilots to wear night vision goggles (NVGs) and were flown as VID missions in order to conduct surveillance on local shipping traffic and identify unknown aircraft. The National Guard Bureau Counter Drug Office obtained special radio frequencies for Air Guard F–16s equipped with the Situational Awareness Data Link (SADL) system. This allowed pilots to share information regarding their fuel status, heading, and altitude without potentially tipping off smugglers to their presence in the area by breaking radio silence.  

Coronet Nighthawk flights over the Caribbean made it more difficult to ship drugs across that sea in ships, boats, and small airplanes, but they did not shut down the traffic altogether. For instance, on August 2, 2001, a pair of Air Guard F–16s from the 119th Fighter Wing, North Dakota ANG, tracked a suspicious airplane flying north from Venezuela. The plane transferred its cargo to a 30-foot “go-fast” boat on the open sea; the powerboat then headed toward the Virgin Islands. The boat and its cargo of nine bales of cocaine, with an estimated street value of $24 million, were captured upon arrival. Even as the mission drew to a close, Coronet Nighthawk fighters made 10 interceptions in the month of August alone.  

Despite the fact that they were flying actual intercept missions, some Air Guard pilots felt that the operation was a waste of time. The F–15 and F–16 fighters used for the mission had immense combat capability, but they were also extremely expensive to operate. For this reason, some Air Force personnel—including many at SOUTHAFC/Twelfth Air Force and at least a few within the ANG—believed that these aircraft were not the ideal airframes for conducting counterdrug operations. In response, SOUTHAFC/Twelfth Air Force developed a plan to transfer this mission to the Cessna Citation 550, an aerial platform belonging to the U.S. Customs Service. Designed as a corporate executive transport jet, the Citation 550 had a longer un-refueled range than the F–15 or F–16, cost less to operate and maintain, and was equipped with radar better suited to tracking slow, low-flying aircraft like those used to transport illicit drugs.  

The decision to discontinue this Air Guard mission was hardly unanimous. Lt. Col. Marvin Whetstone, Counter Drug Program Manager for the National Guard Bureau, observed that there had always been considerable controversy about Coronet Nighthawk because key members of the Twelfth Air Force—which controlled the program—firmly believed that the Air National Guard should not be in the counterdrug business. According to Whetstone, this prevailing attitude led the Twelfth Air Force staff to misrepresent the results of a cost analysis completed regarding the operation. For instance, Coronet Nighthawk showed an annual operation was a waste of time. The F–15 and F–16 fighters used for the mission had immense combat capability, but they were also extremely expensive to operate. For this reason, some Air Force personnel—including many at SOUTHAFC/Twelfth Air Force and at least a few within the ANG—believed that these aircraft were not the ideal airframes for conducting counterdrug operations. In response, SOUTHAFC/Twelfth Air Force developed a plan to transfer this mission to the Cessna Citation 550, an aerial platform belonging to the U.S. Customs Service. Designed as a corporate executive transport jet, the Citation 550 had a longer un-refueled range than the F–15 or F–16, cost less to operate and maintain, and was equipped with radar better suited to tracking slow, low-flying aircraft like those used to transport illicit drugs.  

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The 119th Fighter Wing, North Dakota ANG, flew the last Air Guard rotation for Coronet Nighthawk. With a new aerial platform in place, SOUTHC/C officially ended the operation on
August 31, 2001. Regarding this final deployment of ANG fighters, Gen. William T. Hobbins, Commander of the Twelfth Air Force, announced: “Termination of F–16 operations at Curaçao do not signal the end of counterdrug air operations there or any intent by USCINCSO [U.S. Commander-in-Chief, SOUTHCOM] to relieve us of executive agent responsibilities for the FOLs [Forward Operating Locations] at Curaçao and Aruba.” Instead, he indicated that in addition to the Cessna Citation 550 flown by U.S. Customs Service pilots, other aircraft—including the U.S. Air Force’s E–3 AWACS and C–130 Senior Scout, as well as the U.S. Navy’s E–2 Hawkeye and “a strong possibility” of the Navy’s P–3/EP–3—would take over “robust counterdrug air operations” from Curaçao. This last statement suggests that the Twelfth Air Force did indeed see value in using tactical military aircraft to conduct counterdrug missions. This said, one should note that none of the potential replacements General Hobbins mentioned for the outgoing ANG F–16s were fighter aircraft. Furthermore, of these potential replacements for Air Guard fighters, the C–130 Senior Scout mission could theoretically be flown by either active Air Force or Air Guard units. Thus, it is impossible to discern—at least from his public statements—whether or not General Hobbins truly believed that the Air National Guard should not be in the counterdrug business.

**Ground-Based Radar Sites**

Although using fighter aircraft to intercept and track suspected drug smugglers represents a non-shooting (but otherwise traditional) version of “projecting air power,” the Air National Guard was involved in counterdrug operations outside the United States prior to Operation Coronet Nighthawk. Early on, SOUTHCOM determined that ground-based radar stations capable of identifying and tracking suspicious aircraft were an essential component of the war on drugs. Starting in 1989, one year before Operation Coronet Nighthawk kicked off, Air Guard units began manning ground-based radar stations in the Caribbean Islands, the Bahamas, and the Dominican Republic to fill gaps in existing SOUTHCOM radar coverage.

To cover other suspected drug-trafficking air-bridges linking South America to the United States, SOUTHCOM decided to establish additional radar sites to close the gaps in its so-called “electronic fence.” By this time, however, the active Air Force had already reduced its ground-based deployable radar assets to the point that it could not maintain wartime readiness and support this new counterdrug mission. As a result, starting in 1992, the ANG took responsibility for sending radar controllers, technicians, and equipment to operate four sites in Latin America in concert with host-nation forces.

The four sites—one each in Peru and Ecuador and two in southern Colombia—operated 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Air Guard personnel rotated in on a regular basis to run these sites. At first, these Guardsmen deployed on short 15-day voluntary tours of active duty that fulfilled their two-week annual training requirement, but later these tours were expanded to 90-day and 120-day rotations as the pool of trained and experienced Air Guard manpower dwindled due to budget cuts, retirements, and shortfalls in retention as some radar unit personnel chose to change military career fields or leave the ANG altogether.

According to Col. John Moseby, Special Assistant to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, the ANG was forced to go to great lengths in order to continue accomplishing the mission:

("After a while, we virtually had to create an active duty component within the Guard that did nothing but [counterdrug] radar deployments...In effect, we had a full-time force that did nothing but rotate in and out of South America.")

Additional Air Guard radar personnel supported the counterdrug mission in Honduras and augmented the Counter Drug Joint Analysis and Planning Teams (JPATs) at the U.S. embassies in Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela.

Statistics indicate that ANG-operated ground-based radar units had a measurable impact on illicit drug trafficking. For instance, in 1992, before these stations were in place, the Colombian government identified some 250 suspected drug flights. In contrast, one year later, with the help of ANG radar stations now operating within its borders, Colombia identified 600 such flights. Colombian officials used this information to track down 27 aircraft engaged in smuggling operations and...
destroy them on the ground. This radar data also permitted Colombian authorities to track drug traffickers to their destinations. As a result, in 1993 alone, Colombian police and military forces raided more than 100 airstrips from which drug smugglers operated.27

Periodic difficulties undermined the drug interdiction mission. Monitoring thousands of square miles of airspace proved challenging. So too did maintaining the delicate political balance required to operate within the borders of various Latin American nations. In one instance, a disagreement over what constituted the proper (and legal) use of counterdrug intelligence threatened to bring international cooperation to a sudden end. At issue was the use of U.S. flight tracking data by the Colombian and Peruvian governments to shoot down aircraft merely suspected of transporting illegal drugs. This violated U.S. views regarding due process of law (innocent until proven guilty), and also opened the U.S. government to being held liable for the deaths of those aboard aircraft that might be shot down by mistake. The debate arose when, on November 4, 1993, a Peruvian Shorts Tucano aircraft shot down a suspected drug smuggler near Pucallpa, Peru. Following this incident, the Colombian government announced its intention to pursue a similar policy and shoot down suspicious aircraft, including those identified by the U.S. radar network.28

In response, SOUTHCOM suspended ground-based radar operations in Colombia and Peru on May 1, 1994. Furthermore, SOUTHCOM prohibited personnel from both Latin American nations from riding aboard U.S. surveillance flights launched from Panama and refused to share counterdrug intelligence gathered from these flights. Colombia and Peru countered by banning U.S. surveillance aircraft (Air Force E–3 AWACS and Navy P–3 Orions) from flying over their territories. Colombia also threatened to expel Air Guard ground-based radar units altogether.29

The disagreements hampered sharing counterdrug information—including time-sensitive data needed to intercept suspected smugglers at their destinations—among the three nations and allowed drug cartels to conduct their smuggling operations with little risk of interdiction. These problems were finally resolved in December 1994, when the United States agreed to share counterdrug intelligence information with Colombia and Peru on the condition that these countries would not hold the United States government liable for the outcome if they chose to use that information to shoot down aircraft suspected of carrying illegal drugs.30

Compared to Operation Coronet Nighthawk, the Air Guard’s participation in ground-based radar operations was relatively short-lived. By 1995, it was clear that operating these sites posed significant challenges to the Air Guard in terms of...
logistical support, mission essential equipment, and manning. In addition, reductions in Air Force and Air National Guard tactical air control squadrons, the growing demand to support contingency operations in Southwest Asia and Eastern Europe, and the anticipated move of U.S. forces out of Panama in 1999 due to treaty commitments led the Air Force to seek other ways to maintain radar coverage of drug-trafficking routes in South America. Ultimately, the DoD terminated Air Guard ground-based radar operations in 1998 to save money and reduce the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) for Air Guard radar units. To maintain the counterdrug electronic fence, responsibility for operating these sites shifted to contractors, commercial resources, and host-nation personnel.31

Domestic Counterdrug Operations, the ANG, and the RC–26 Surveillance Aircraft

As mentioned earlier in this article, the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 prohibits the U.S. military from engaging in civil law enforcement activities inside the United States without prior Presidential approval. To be more specific, the Posse Comitatus Act applies only to members of the military who are serving under the terms and conditions set forth by U.S. Code Title 10. Since the active duty military and members of the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Reserves always fall under Title 10—which means “Federal money, Federal missions, Federal control”31—Posse Comitatus remains in effect for these forces at all times. Members of the National Guard, however, do not always fall under Title 10. As a result, there are certain conditions under which Posse Comitatus does not apply to these personnel.

For instance, when mobilized under State Active Duty (SAD) status, a National Guard soldier or airman falls under the command of the state’s Adjutant General. Because the Adjutant General is appointed by and reports directly to the governor, he or she does not fall under the national civil-military chain-of-command wherein the President serves as Commander-in-Chief. In SAD status, Army and Air Guard personnel receive pay and benefits in accordance with state law. Thus, while on State Active Duty, the soldier or airman has no official federal military status and serves—in the truest sense—as a member of the state militia.

There is a second condition under which Posse Comitatus does not apply: National Guard soldiers or airmen serving under U.S. Code Title 32 orders receive the pay and benefits entitled to military personnel on federal active duty, but they still fall under the non-federal command and control of their state’s Adjutant General. Title 32 applies only within the borders of the United States and its territories, and it only applies to members of the National Guard. Because members of the active duty military and the Reserves always fall under federal control, Title 32 cannot apply to them.32

At first glance, Posse Comitatus, SAD, and Title 32 may seem like just so much legal mumbo-

* These six words—“Federal money, Federal missions, Federal control”—indicate that military personnel serving under Title 10 status are paid by the Federal government, can only conduct missions as directed by the Federal government, and ultimately report to the President of the United States as their Commander-in-Chief. As such, personnel serving in Title 10 status can neither be mobilized nor controlled by a state governor in order to conduct state missions, including (but not limited to) riot control or disaster relief.
jumbo, but in fact these laws have long played a significant role in counterdrug operations. For instance, in 1977—five years before President Reagan fired the first shot in the federal war on drugs—police in Hawaii requested support from the Army National Guard for “Operation Green Harvest.” In this instance, Army Guard helicopters flew civilian law enforcement personnel on missions to identify marijuana fields from the air. In later operations conducted throughout the United States, Army Guard OV–1D turboprop observation aircraft and Air Guard RF–4C jets conducted aerial photo reconnaissance missions in support of civilian law enforcement agencies, and the film from these missions was processed by National Guard photo labs. The National Guard air and ground crews involved in supporting these civilian-led counterdrug operations gained valuable training related to their wartime missions. However, if not for their Title 32 status and the fact that they were working under the supervision of civilian law enforcement officials, these Guardsmen could not have taken part in domestic counterdrug operations. Thus, Title 32 played a significant role in the decision to expand the National Guard’s contribution to the war on drugs at home by creating full-time counterdrug units in several states.33

Although most of the personnel in these dedicated counterdrug units were drawn from the Army National Guard, the Air Guard took responsibility for manning and operating the new RC–26 counterdrug aircraft. The RC–26 is essentially a modified version of the U.S. military’s C–26 operational support aircraft. Based on Fairchild’s twin-engine turboprop Metroliner, these planes were designed to transport cargo and personnel over short to medium distances in a non-tactical environment.34

The ANG initially ordered 11 C–26A aircraft for operational support purposes, and in March 1989, the 147th Fighter Interceptor Group, Texas ANG, took delivery of the Air Guard’s first C–26. In 1991, the ANG ordered an additional 30 aircraft, by now upgraded to the B model, with an option to purchase 23 more. By this time, leaders within the National Guard had started considering using this aircraft as a platform to provide an “eye-in-the-sky” for civilian law enforcement counterdrug operations.35

Before any official decisions were made to modify the C–26 to conduct counterdrug operations, the National Guard Bureau received requests for counterdrug versions of the C–26 from 23 state governors and their Adjutants General. Fairchild conducted an operational test with a modified C–26 from January 14 to July 31, 1992, which included providing operational support missions to 27 civilian law enforcement agencies in four states via the ANG. Most-requested missions included photo reconnaissance, aerial surveillance of border and coastal areas, and aerial surveillance of suspected indoor marijuana cultivation and methamphetamine labs.36

In April and August 1992, law enforcement agencies across the United States participated in two independent surveys, which validated the need for a counterdrug aircraft capable of photo-reconnaissance and electronic surveillance. The surveys also indicated that law enforcement agencies agreed that the modified C–26 aircraft should be assigned to specific geographic locations within each state and be made available on short notice.37

Lt. Gen. John B. Conaway, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, requested the initial purchase of counterdrug C–26 aircraft, and Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice approved this application in April 1991. However, the road from concept to completion was far from smooth. In 1992, a scathing report by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) recommended that Congress cut funding for the RC–26 (at the time known as the UC–26C) program. The report concluded in part:

In our view, acquisition of the UC–26C would not have been approved if DoD’s standard requiring a validated threat had been applied. It is also uncertain that procurement of the prototype would have been approved, even with a validated threat, if DoD had first tried to fill the requirement with resources already in the interdiction agencies’ inventories—such as comparable aircraft operated by the Customs Service.38

In March 1994, the DoD Inspector General’s office released a report that echoed the GAO’s earlier conclusions and again recommended that the RC–26 program be scrapped. However, following a detailed re-verification of the counterdrug mission by Maj. Gen. Donald W. Shepperd, Director of the Air National Guard, and with the backing of Maj. Gen. Raymond F. Rees, Acting Chief of the National Guard Bureau, the U.S. Air Force finally approved converting the airplanes for their new role.39

Modifications included installing a removable sensor pod, thermal imaging system, cameras, data recorders, special radars, and other electronic information-gathering equipment. Each RC–26 cost $3 million to modify and about $900,000 per year to operate—about one-third the cost of conducting the
same mission using a C-130 military transport plane. The DoD paid this cost as part of the National Guard Bureau's counterdrug program. 40

A typical RC–26 crew included a pilot and copilot, plus one or more mission system operators to control the reconnaissance camera and forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR) pod. Since the aircrews had no law enforcement authority and every RC–26 mission supported a specific request from a civilian agency, at least one civilian law enforcement officer flew with each sortie. From the program's inception, each Air Guard unit equipped with an RC–26 has maintained two or three trained aircrews to provide maximum short-notice availability.

Because these missions are flown in support of larger operations, it is difficult to quantify the results of the RC–26 program in traditional counterdrug terms like “pounds of drugs seized” or “millions of dollars worth of drugs taken off the street.” However, since its inception, RC–26 crews have flown thousands of hours in support of law enforcement agencies. Missions include photographing marijuana fields, cocaine processing centers, and drug-smuggling routes. These aircraft have also transported evidence and key witnesses to trial and hearings and provided airborne command and control for drug stakeouts and raids. Based on their historic high rate of use by supported civilian agencies, this program (which continues to this day) appears to be a success.

Promoting Host-Nation and Regional Stability: the “New Horizons” Exercises

The fourth case study regarding pre-9/11 ANG activities directed against non-state actors focuses on a series of humanitarian and civic assistance exercises conducted annually in the Caribbean and Latin America. Known collectively as Nuevos Horizontes or “New Horizons,” the first exercise by this name kicked off in Panama in January 1996. However, New Horizons actually represented the unbroken continuation of an earlier series of similar exercises that started in 1984, including “Blazing Trails,” Caminos de la Paz or “Roads of Peace,” and Fuertes Caminos or “Strong Roads.” 41

The New Horizons exercise program—which, like the RC–26 program continues to the present—involves deploying units from the Army and Air National Guard as well as Active and Reserve Army, Air Force, Navy, and USMC units to conduct civil engineering and medical civic action missions. The following mission statement from one such exercise clearly shows the intended outcome:

**Purpose:** Provides training for U.S. units and allied nation participants in Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Operations resulting in a by-product of construction and medical projects for the host nation.

**Description:** A Joint exercise for training Medical, Engineer, Civil Affairs, MP, and Logistics units in...
From the start, several New Horizons exercises took place every year, each in a different country and each involving different U.S. military units. A typical exercise lasted for several months, with Guard and Reserve forces rotating in and out of the host nation to complete their two-week annual training requirement while a small cadre of active duty or Guardsmen/Reservists served as the exercise command and support staff for the duration. Most New Horizons exercises also involved host-nation military forces and government agencies working side-by-side with their U.S. counterparts in order to provide training to all involved and put a “local face” on these operations.

The phrase “projecting air power” typically conjures images of putting “iron in the air” (launching aircraft sorties) and dropping bombs on target. For some, this alone makes the connection between projecting air power and exercises like New Horizons seem obscure. Although Operation Coronet Night-hawk and domestic ANG counterdrug operations did not entail dropping bombs or shooting bullets, they at least involved using aircraft against non-state actor opponents. The connection between operating ground-based radar sites and air power is also fairly obvious. But what about humanitarian and civic assistance missions like New Horizons that use no airplanes (except for transportation) and deliberately avoid any mention of counternarcotics operations or America’s war on drugs?

Prior to September 2001, DoD counterdrug efforts fell under the umbrella of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). The term MOOTW (which was officially retired in September 2001, although the programs it described continued under different names) encompassed numerous military missions that fall somewhere short of a full-scale shooting war. In addition to DoD Counterdrug Operations, examples include: Humanitarian Assistance (HA); Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency (sometimes abbreviated as COIN); Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO); and Peacekeeping or Peace Enforcement Operations. United States military doctrine further defined DoD counterdrug operations under MOOTW to include detecting aerial and maritime shipments of illegal drugs entering the United States, as well as using the National Guard to support drug interdiction and enforcement agencies within the continental United States. Nothing in this definition directly linked the term “counterdrug” with operations or exercises like New Horizons.

However, a closer look reveals that a connection—and a strong one—does exist. By definition, the Nation Assistance aspect of MOOTW involves:

...civil or military assistance (other than HA) rendered to a nation by U.S. forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crisis or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation. Nation assistance operations support an HN [Host Nation] by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability [emphasis from original source].

This assistance can include any or all of the following: Security Assistance programs (such as grants, loans, or sales of defense-related equipment and training); Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA); and Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions. By doctrine, HCA programs—under which the New Horizons exercises clearly fell—“must fulfill military training requirements [for the U.S. military] that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace.” On the other hand, FID traditionally “focused on help-
The INDIRECT NATURE OF THIS CONNECTION MAKES IT DIFFICULT TO MEASURE THE RESULTS OF NEW HORIZONS

IT IS FAR MORE USEFUL TO ... CONSIDER THESE RESULTS IN THE LARGER CONTEXT OF PROMOTING LONG-TERM REGIONAL STABILITY

ing another nation defeat an organized movement attempting to overthrow the government.” However, U.S. doctrine also recognized that “FID programs may address other threats to an HN’s internal stability, such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism.”

Unlike traditional insurgencies, members of drug cartels generally do not seek to take direct control of any particular nation’s government, at least not for nationalistic or ideological reasons. Most would be happy to leave the task of day-to-day governance to others—so long as those “others” do not interfere with the drug cartel members’ ability to cultivate, process, and transport illicit drugs for profit and to live without fear of arrest, prosecution, or extradition. To achieve these goals, however, drug cartels have engaged in several tactics that closely resemble those used by traditional insurgents: equipping and fielding paramilitary organizations that may actually be more powerful than a nation’s own security forces; targeting political and social leaders, including judges, journalists, and members of the church who oppose the cartels; co-opting or coercing the local populace; and otherwise undermining the legitimacy of the existing government so that it cannot effectively combat the illicit drug trade.

Although Humanitarian and Civic Assistance and Foreign Intelligence Defense are not synonymous, they do share the same overall goal: “to promote long-term regional security.” And although the HCA operations, unlike FID, do not directly target illicit drug trafficking, the “long-term regional security” that they promote helps create an environment in which the legitimate government can more effectively address the illegal drug trade, hence the implicit connection between New Horizons and America’s war on drugs.

The indirect nature of this connection makes it difficult to measure the results of New Horizons in the war on drugs, especially since exercise planners deliberately avoided suggesting any connections between the two programs. Therefore, for the purpose of examining ways in which the ANG has engaged non-state actors prior to 9/11, it is far more useful to describe the number, type, and scope of missions performed and to consider these results in the larger context of promoting long-term regional stability.

According to one source, more than 35 New Horizons exercises took place in some 20 countries between 1996 and 2001. Table 1 (right) provides a summary of the New Horizons exercises scheduled for one year, including the U.S. forces involved and the major focus for each exercise.

As the right-hand column in Table 1 suggests, the Army was a key player in most New Horizons deployments. This comes as no surprise, given the requirement for heavy construction and combat engineer personnel and equipment to drill wells for potable water, clear and improve roads, build or repair bridges, and construct the clinics, schools, and other buildings urgently needed by inhabitants of the poor, mostly-rural regions where these operations took place. However, it is easy to forget—especially if one comes from a “green” (Army-centric) background instead of a “blue” (Air Force) or “purple” (joint) background, or if one thinks of air power primarily as putting iron in the air and bombs on target—that the ANG also possesses considerable civil engineering capability. For instance, RED HORSE squadrons (Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineers) are self-sufficient, fully-deployable units designed to repair or build runways, air bases, and support facilities in an austere environment. Prime BEEF (Base Engineer Emergency Forces) are smaller deployable units that provide direct support to deployed forces and emergency recovery from natural disasters. In addition, like its Army counterpart, the Air Guard can field considerable medical assets to provide varying levels of treatment in the field.

A closer look at Table 1 reveals that the Air National Guard played a key role in at least one of the exercises scheduled for Fiscal Year 1999: New Horizons—Honduras, which ran from February to September of that year. According to a planning document dated November 30, 1998, of the approximately 2,600 U.S. service members scheduled to go to Honduras for New Horizons 1999, only 80 would stay for the duration, while the rest would rotate through in 2-week increments. As a result, planners estimated that 350 to 450 U.S. troops would be in Honduras at one time for New Horizons.51 Air Guardsmen provided part of the “duration staff.” The ANG also provided much of the civil engineering and medical capability for the exercise on a rotational basis, including three Prime BEEF units, four well-drilling detachments, and three Medical Readiness Training Events (MEDRETE).

Most New Horizons exercises scheduled for 1999 were expanded to provide relief in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch. The storm, which made landfall in late October 1998, was the most devastating hurricane to hit Central America in two hundred years. In Honduras, the New Horizons program focused on the Lempira region, widely considered to be the poorest and most neglected part of the country. A report prepared prior to the deployment noted that “The extreme poverty, shortage of food and potable water, and lack of sanitation, especially outside the cities, have a very negative effect on health.” The report went on to describe local conditions in painful detail:

...nearly all rural homes have dirt floors, many have plank and mud walls, and there are almost no means of keeping warm and dry. Only half the villages have (relatively) potable water. Most rural Lempirans lack functional latrines, and only 2 percent of the villages have sewage systems. Garbage collection services are almost nil, and only a minority of the population bothers to burn trash....

The same report indicated that even before the hurricane struck, the region’s infrastructure was in dire straits. For instance, only four percent of the
territory—which spanned 1,680 square miles and had roughly 224,000 inhabitants—had electricity. There was only one hospital to serve the entire region. Roads were scarce, bridges nonexistent or in poor repair. Thus, Lempira was a prime candidate for a New Horizons exercise: plenty of real-world training for U.S. military civil engineer and medical personnel in an extremely austere environment, and a local population that could clearly benefit from this endeavor.

This single example illustrates both the mission-specific intent as well as the broader strategic implications behind the New Horizons program. Although these exercises have never directly supported—or even alluded to—either U.S. or host-nation counternarcotics operations, they do reinforce the democratic host-nation institutions that must take the lead in counternarcotics efforts within their borders. Actively involving host-nation civil and military personnel in the New Horizons projects helps build public support for the legitimate government in previously underserved regions—historically the prime bases of operation for those involved in the illicit drug trade. Thus, obscure as this case study’s connections might at first seem, it too represents a case of projecting air power against non-state actors as part of the U.S. war on drugs.

Conclusion and Lessons Learned

According to George Santayana—one of the great philosophers and cultural critics of the early 20th century—“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” Note that

Table 1: Summary of New Horizons Exercises – Fiscal Year 1999
(October 1, 1998 thru September 30, 1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host Nation</th>
<th>Inclusive Dates</th>
<th>a) Primary U.S. Military Force(s) Involved</th>
<th>b) Major Focus for Exercise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Feb – Sept 99</td>
<td>a) ANG and ARNG</td>
<td>Road and bridge repair and construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Feb – Sept 99</td>
<td>a) ARNG and USN/USMC</td>
<td>Bridge repair and school construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>March – Sept 99</td>
<td>a) USAR</td>
<td>Horizontal construction (roads and bridges) and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b)</td>
<td>vertical construction (buildings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>March – Sept 99</td>
<td>a) USAF/ANG and USAR</td>
<td>Vertical construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>March – July 99</td>
<td>a) USAR and USAF (component not specified)</td>
<td>Mission focus not specified in source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>April – Sept 99</td>
<td>a) USN/USMC with USAF medical support.</td>
<td>Mission focus not specified in source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>April – Aug 99</td>
<td>a) U.S. Army</td>
<td>Construction projects and medical operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>May – Aug 99</td>
<td>a) U.S. Army (component not specified in source)</td>
<td>Vertical construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>May – Aug 99</td>
<td>a) USAF, U.S. Army, USN/USMC</td>
<td>Mission focus not specified in source, but the units involved were capable of drilling wells, both horizontal and vertical construction, and providing medical assistance to local populace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Acronyms used in this Table:
ANG: Air National Guard
ARNG: Army National Guard
USAF: U.S. Air Force (active component unless otherwise specified)
USAR: Army Reserve
USN/USMC: Navy and/or Marine Corps (active and/or reserve)

Santayana did not say: “Historical case studies provide cookie-cutter solutions for present or future problems.” As promised, the authors have not drawn direct comparisons between the history of the war on drugs and the present-day war on terror. But what, then, can we learn about confronting non-state actors from the pre-9/11 war on drugs that might help in today’s (and tomorrow’s) war on terror?

Perhaps the most obvious lesson is that just because the terminology changes over time, in many cases the underlying concepts, issues, and problems remain essentially the same. While this should go without saying, too often it seems that the leaders and policy makers casting about for lessons-learned from history overlook a past event simply because the labels used “back then” do not match the terms and buzzwords in current use. When President Reagan declared a “War on Drugs” in 1982, he defined the enemy as “narco-traffickers” and “drug dealers,” not “non-state actors.” Not until the mid-1990s did the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff start referring to “non-state actors” in the National Military Strategy. However, when one looks at the modern definition of non-state actor, it is immediately clear that the narco-traffickers and drug dealers against whom President Reagan declared war were, even then, acting in the same ways (and presenting the same basic challenges) as some of today’s non-state actors.

There are more specific lessons to be learned from the case studies described above, as well. These are not tactics or techniques for engaging an adversary on the battlefield, but rather “big picture” takeaways that can help leaders to make full and proper use of all available assets.

For example, despite the questionable cost-benefit return of using fighter aircraft in the war on drugs, Operation Coronet Nighthawk serves as a reminder that volunteers from National Guard and Reserve operational units can be deployed on a rotational basis in order to conduct real-world mission training and, at the same time, protect America’s borders. And as shown during Coronet Nighthawk, it is possible to accomplish this without increasing OPTEMPO beyond the normal training requirements.

The ANG’s experience with ground-based radar sites reinforces one part of the lesson described above, although it also carries with it a cautionary tale of continued long-term operations placing unreasonable strain on a predominately part-time force. But the ground-based radar case study highlights another potential lesson: the ANG (and other Guard and Reserve forces) may have personnel and equipment that the active components do not. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the ANG was able to provide ground-based radar units and the people to run them, assets that had been largely phased out of the active Air Force. It is entirely possible that Guard and Reserve units today can offer capabilities simply not found within their active duty counterparts.

Reviewing the New Horizons HCA exercise
Four case studies produced, four lessons learned. First, terms change far faster than the threats; remember this when searching history for “lessons learned.” Second, as Operation Coronet Nighthawk and the New Horizons exercises in particular show, involuntary mobilizations for extended periods are not the only way that National Guard troops and airmen can contribute to real-world DoD national security missions without adversely affecting wartime mission readiness. However, as a corollary (or perhaps counterpoint) to this lesson, the ANG experience with ground-based radars in South and Central America serves as a reminder that it is indeed possible to over-commit limited personnel and resources, thus creating an unsustainable OPTEMPO. Third, Title 32 status provides decision makers with a degree of flexibility in using the National Guard to support domestic antiterrorism efforts. And last, but certainly not least, the Guard and Reserves can potentially provide capabilities that the active duty military lacks.

These, in the authors’ opinions at least, represent the type of “lessons learned” that we should seek from studying history. It seems highly unlikely that any case study from any era will provide “the grand solution” to the myriad challenges facing the United States in the ongoing war on terror. But by continuing to look to history, and by recognizing that the “lessons learned” are often complex and can simultaneously provide examples of programs that worked and reveal potential pitfalls (often in the same programs that “worked”), we can indeed help to shape the future by knowing the past.

NOTES


9. President Reagan established the National Narcotics border Interdiction System (NNBIS) in March of 1983 to coordinate the actions of all federal agencies involved in any aspect of interdicting the flow of illegal drugs across the border into the United States. The NNBIS was headed by then Vice President George Bush. Its Executive Board included members from the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, Transportation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and White House Drug Abuse Policy Office. Francis M. Mullen, Jr., Acting Administrator of the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), also served on the board. According to an official DEA history: “The role of NNBIS was to complement, but not to replace, the duties of the regional Drug Enforcement Task Forces operated by the Department of Justice.” A chronology published by the U.S. Coast Guard provides more detail on what this actually entailed: “The new system provided a coordinated national and inter-agency network for prioritizing interdiction targets, identifying resources, recommending the most effective action, and coordinating joint special actions.” This source also notes: “Coast Guard anti-narcotic operations were reinforced when needed by military forces” but provides no further details. As part of the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, the White House established the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), which took over (and expanded) the duties formerly performed by the NBBIS. The Director of the ONDCP, ubiquitously known as the “Drug Czar,” is a cabinet-level position. See Drug Enforcement Administration: A Tradition of Excellence, 1973-2003 (Washington, D.C.: DEA, n.d.), 50, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/history/history_part1.pdf (accessed May 8, 2008); Policy Changes/Major Events & Their Influence on the Missions & Capabilities of the U.S. Coast Guard and Its Predecessor Services, http://www.uscg.mil/history/Policy_Changes.html (accessed May 8, 2008); and “About ONDCP” Office of National Drug Control Policy, http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/about/index.html (accessed May 8, 2008).


13. Coronet Nighthawk supported the SOUTHCOM Commander’s requirements using the following command relationships: the Joint Interagency Task Force—East (JIATF-E) exercised Tactical Control (TACON); U.S. Southern Air Forces (SOUTHAIR/Twelfth Air Force) had operational control (OPCON). The National Guard Bureau (NGB) Counterdrug Office provided program management for Coronet Nighthawk. While deployed to support Coronet Nighthawk, Air Guard aircraft and personnel were designated as the 12th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, Twelfth Air Force History: 2001 (Headquarters, Twelfth Air Force, c. 2002), pp. 88-90, on file as SD V-50 for Gross, ANG History: 2001-2004 ["on file as SD…” indicates that a source is a "Supporting Document" for the specified Air National Guard periodic history and is on file at Maxwell AFB with that periodic history]; and Master Sergeant Bob Haskell, National Guard Bureau, “Air Guard Finishes Up Last ‘Nighthawk’ Mission,” On Guard, Summer 2001, pp. 12-13, on file as SD V-44 for Gross, ANG History: 2001-2004.


16. See note 13 (above) for more information on JIATF-E.


25. Mosby interview, p. 84.


“Colombia Bans American Anti-Drug Flights.”


36. Ibid.


38. Briefing from U.S. GAO, National Security and International Affairs Division to Chair, Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Subject: “Procurement and Modification of Aircraft and Other Equipment Used for Drug Detection and Monitoring” (Jul. 30, 1992).


40. This test indicated that it cost $1.69 million to operate a C-130 for 500 flight hours, whereas a C-26 could operate the same number of hours for $551,000. The $900,000 annual operating cost cited in the main text of this article appears to reflect a usage rate higher than 500 hours; logically, the cost of operating a C-130 transport for more than 500 hours would be proportionally higher, as well. Source: Gross, ANG History, 1992-1994, p. 116.


43. One of the changes announced in the September 10, 2001 revision to Joint Publication 3-0 was the decision by the Department of Defense to stop using the term and acronym “Military Operations Other Than War” (MOOTW). See “Summary of Changes: Revision of Joint Publication 3-0, dated 10 September 2001,” in Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations, p. iii.


46. Ibid.

47. Ibid., Chapter III, Para. 2i, p. III-10.


49. Ornsbee, WHO’s Scroll. These countries include: Antigua and Barbuda; the Bahamas; Belize; Bolivia; the Commonwealth of Dominica; the Dominican Republic; Ecuador; El Salvador; Grenada; Guatemala; Haiti; Honduras; Jamaica; Nicaragua; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; St. Kitts and Nevis; St. Lucia; and Trinidad/Tobago.


58. Poverty and anti-Western sentiment alone do not cause terrorism, but they are widely recognized as contributing factors in creating an environment where fundamentalist terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda can flourish. The failed state of Afghanistan in the 1990s or, more recently, countries in the war-torn region of the Horn of Africa, are prime examples. Kalic, Combating a Modern Hydra, pp. 58-59.
A MISSION OF VENGEANCE: VICHY FRE
The death of an American fighter pilot in the jungles of French Indochina in March 1944, helped to save the lives of twenty-nine downed American fliers in that country. The fallout from his death also provided the Japanese with an excuse to take over the French colony a year later. As is well known, the Japanese had occupied Indochina militarily before World War II but had allowed the French to continue to govern the colony. Vietnam, as Indochina is called now, accordingly became the object of an intensive American air campaign after Pearl Harbor. The bombing of strategic Japanese targets in northern Vietnam started in 1942, first by the American Volunteer Group (AVG), or “Flying Tigers,” then by the China Air Task Force (CATF) of the Tenth Air Force, and later by the Fourteenth Air Force. Beginning in December 1944, attacks on Japanese targets in southern Vietnam were made by the U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet’s Catalinas, B–24s, and Privateers as well as by carrier aircraft from Admiral William Halsey’s Third Fleet. Additional attacks were made by B–29s of the XX Bomb Group flying out of India and by Liberators, Mitchells, and Lightnings belonging to the Fifth and Twentieth Air Forces operating from bases in the Philippines.1

At least 414 American fliers paid the supreme price carrying out those missions as did over thirty British and French aviators who died flying various types of missions over Vietnam. The first American killed in Vietnam was “Tiger” John T. Donovan of the Third AVG Pursuit Squadron, who died on May 12, 1942 during a raid on the Japanese air base at Gia Lam near Hanoi.2

What is not as well known is that the Japanese in Vietnam were aided in their occupation of the French colony by a puppet government headed by French Vice Admiral Jean Decoux, a cold, haughty sailor consumed by an overbearing sense of prestige and rank.3 Decoux had been appointed to the post of governor general of Vietnam by the pro-Axis government of Marshal Philippe Pétain, located at Vichy, a spa in central France. The Governor-General thereafter washed his hands of all ethical, political or moral consequences that flowed from his obedience to Vichy. The admirals ran the country as if it were a ship in the French Navy, and used his naval officers to impose Pétain’s anti-democratic, anti-Semitic, and anti-Ally policies on the colony. Decoux said later in his own defense4 that he was taking orders from a legal government of France and the latter was not at war with Japan. Whenever his policies were questioned or criticized, he argued that some accommodation with the forces of the Rising Sun was necessary.5 The admiral’s policy was known locally in Indochina as “pas des incidents.”

Decoux’s police forces and a paramilitary organization he created, the French Legion of War Veterans and Volunteers of the National Revolution, imposed Vichy’s dictatorial policies on Vietnam and vigorously persecuted opponents of Decoux’s regime. The victims were mainly Freemasons, soldiers and civil servants suspected of being pro-British or sympathetic to General Charles de Gaulle’s Free French movement that had repudiated Vichy as well as socialists, communists, Jews, and anyone suspected of “resistance” activities. For example, French aviation war heroes, Lt. Eugène Robert and Sgt. William Labussière (a member of the underground who flew for General Chennault’s first international air force in China), attempted to escape to join the Free French but were captured and sentenced to years of forced labor. They were joined in prison by a world-famous medical doctor and Free French representative in China, Dr. Eugène Béchamp, who died later due to a lack of proper medical treatment. The trio was soon joined by the future author of the Bridge over the River Kwai, Lt. Pierre Boulle, who attempted to penetrate Vietnam to set up a Free French underground network. Decoux’s suppression consequently greatly hindered the growth of any French underground movement in Vietnam, though individuals and small groups did what they could to further the Allied cause.6

Decoux’s Policy

Despite a loudly-proclaimed mission to destroy all vestiges of White colonialism in Southeast Asia, the Japanese military tolerated Decoux’s rule in Vietnam because the admiral aggressively—not passively—pursued a policy of military cooperation with Vietnam’s occupiers in order to prove his loyalty to the Rising Sun. On December 9, 1941, the day after the Japanese had struck at European possessions in Southeast Asia from bases in Vietnam, Admiral Decoux assured the Japanese military command in writing that he would “collaborate with the Japanese Armed Forces by all measures in accordance with existing agreements between Japan and France....”78 Among his other acts of collaboration with the Japanese, Decoux sent a team of engineers to the Netherlands East Indies to help the Japanese repair sabotaged oil

Martin L. Mickelsen is a seven-year U.S. Army veteran and received a Ph.D. in French colonial history during World War II from the University of Georgia. After teaching, he retired as a Senior Researcher from the State of Georgia’s Department of Industry, Trade and Tourism and is now active in development research. Several of his earlier articles have been published in national and international journals. He has spent the past ten years researching the air war fought in Vietnam during World War II and the French underground’s efforts to help downed fliers escape to safety in China.
facilities there. He sanctioned a Japanese takeover of the majority of the Vichy French merchant shipping fleet in Vietnam, quibbling solely over payment for the ships, and even offered to let French sailors serve under Japanese command. But when he tried to force French sailors to do so, the sailors mutinied. The admiral shared military intelligence information on the Nationalist Chinese with the Japanese and he set up a warning system to alert the Japanese air force of incoming bombing raids from China by the American air force. Decoux ordered French anti-aircraft batteries to shoot down “foreign” (Chinese and American) airplanes. And he pushed Vichy to approve a joint Japanese-Vichy Vietnamese expedition to invade and occupy New Caledonia (a French island in the Pacific that had rallied to General Charles de Gaulle’s Free French movement) which was protected first by Australian troops and later by American forces. In a telegram to Tokyo intercepted by American intelligence in February 1942, the Japanese ambassador in Hanoi praised Decoux’s collaboration, noting their “two countries are very nearly allies” because the admiral was giving Japan “complete cooperation in the political, economic and military fields.” What resistance Decoux did offer to the Japanese stemmed from their heavy-handed attempts to take over the economy of Vietnam without allowing French firms to maintain controlling interests in those enterprises, from efforts by lower-ranking, insubordinate Japanese officers and civilians to turn the Vietnamese population against
the French or from Japan’s failure to pay their bills for the goods and rice Vietnam furnished them. What resistance Decoux offered the Japanese, according to a Fourteenth Air Force intelligence summary, was to protect French interests in Vietnam, not to help the Allies.

What is also not well known is that Admiral Decoux held on to power by turning over to the Japanese seventeen American fliers captured by his police or military units as proof of his continuing loyalty to Vichy’s policy of military, economic and political collaboration with Japan. In addition, the admiral condoned the seizure and imprisonment of the American consul general in Hanoi and the vice consul in Saigon by the Japanese army, even though the parent Vichy government in France and the United States maintained diplomatic relations until November 1942. The diplomats later complained that there was “no effort by Government General to assist or communicate with American consular officials” after they were seized.10 The first five American combatants whom Decoux handed over were from the Philippines—one P–40 pilot from the 17th Pursuit Squadron, three air corps sergeants, and one army engineer captain. The five had landed near Tourane in a thirty-nine-foot launch on March 22, 1942.11 In late 1943, four of those five were transferred to a prisoner of war camp in Thailand where they worked on the railroad of death.

When the French Army command objected to his policy of surrendering the five Americans to the Japanese, Decoux issued Directive No. 1415-DN1/2 on April 27, 1942. The directive took responsibility for any future cases involving combatants at war with Japan out of the army’s hands. The capture of Allied servicemen by his forces thereafter was to be reported immediately to Decoux and “was to be kept secret” since the problem of American captives involved “political consequences.” He would personally give instructions as to what information was to be communicated to the Japanese concerning the capture of Americans and how the Japanese would be allowed to interrogate the captives.12

The next American surrendered to the Japanese was a “Flying Tiger,” captured on May 17, 1942, at Lao Kay on the Sino-Vietnamese border. He was turned over on Decoux’s order to the Japanese, who then refused to return him to French custody and shipped him off to a POW camp in China.13 Two British prisoners of war ran afoul of Decoux’s policy in July 1942, after they escaped from a Japanese prison camp in Saigon and made their way to a French army post about thirty miles from Saigon. The POWs asked for the army’s protection but were returned to the Japanese on Decoux’s orders. They were beheaded a few weeks later.14 On August 31, 1943, reacting to an increase in the American bombing campaign in Tonkin, Decoux issued orders that any downed American fliers were to be turned over to the Japanese on the spot.15

Under Decoux’s new policy, twelve more Americans, all fliers shot down over Tonkin between September 1943, and January 1944, were surrendered to the Japanese on demand.16 Fifteen days after he issued his new directive, a squadron of five unescorted B–24 Liberators was ambushed by thirty-five or more Japanese fighters over Haiphong. Three of the B–24s were shot down. The first bomber crashed in the sea without survivors. A bombardier and a navigator aboard “Pistol-Packing Mama” bailed out of the second plane only to be strafed by the circling fighters and were wounded. They were picked up by a Vichy French search party, and taken to Lanessan Hospital in Hanoi, where they were treated for their wounds. The wounded fliers were abused by a pro-German doctor in the hospital, who then turned the men over to the Japanese on the orders of Decoux.17

Vietnamese Guards, a militia traditionally employed by Vietnamese authorities as auxiliary police, captured three other crewmen from “Mama” near their crashed plane, and turned them over to a Japanese search party.18 The third B–24, “Temp- tation,” crashed near Thai Nguyen. Circling Japanese fighters killed four of the crewmen by shooting them in their parachutes. Four survivors were captured by the Vietnamese Guard and surrendered on the spot to the nearest Japanese patrol. One crewman died during torture in a Japanese prison in Hanoi, another victim of Decoux’s policies.19 All of the surviving captured B–24 fliers were sent first to a Kempeitai police station in Cholon (Saigon) for interrogation, and then transferred to a POW camp in Singapore.20 The next Haiphong bombing mission on October 1, 1943 by twenty-one B–24s was accompanied by Fourteenth Air Force fighters, but saw a Chinese Air Force escort pilot shot down by the Japanese.21 During the same mission an American P–40 pilot was forced to bail out over Phi Dien after he was hit by bomber fire.22 Six days later, another P–40 Shark was shot down by “friendly fire” from a B–24 during a dogfight with Japanese fighters, but the pilot parachuted to safety near Lang Vai.23 Four months after that, a fourth P–40 pilot experienced mechanical difficulties on a mission over Tonkin and rode his plane down into a rice paddy near Huu San. All four fighter pilots were captured by Vichy military forces, or by Vietnamese auxiliaries, and promptly surrendered on the spot to the Japanese. One pilot was roughed up when he attempted to escape from the Vietnamese guards24 but all four survived the war: the first three in POW camps in China and Japan; the last at Singapore. Finally, a Dutch prisoner of war who tried to escape from a transport anchored off Cap St. Jacques met the same fate as the two beheaded British prisoners.25

The number of fliers and Allied prisoners of war whom Decoux had handed to the Japanese was quite small. The policy, however, illustrated that he was willing to hold on to power for Vichy in Vietnam with the blood of at least five of them on his hands. The ones who were not killed as a direct result of his policy were doomed to years of suffering in Japanese prisoner of war camps or to working on the “Hell Railroad” in Burma and Thailand.
It took the death of an American P–40 pilot from Pima, Arizona, to force Decoux to change his policy. At the time, American intelligence claimed that the admiral’s policy was changed in response to “a mission of vengeance” undertaken by the Fourteenth Air Force against the Vichy colonial authorities held responsible for the pilot’s death.

The Norton Affair

At 3 p.m. on March 9, 1944, four P–40s from the 51st Fighter Group, 26th Fighter Squadron of the Fourteenth Air Force took off from their base at Nanning, China, on a strafing and bombing mission in northern Vietnam. Their target was a concentration of concrete and brick barracks located five or six miles to the west of the village of Luc Nam. The village was located nine miles from a Japanese airbase at Lam on a highway that ran to the administrative capital of Bac Giang province, Phu Lang Thuong.

No anti-aircraft fire greeted the Sharks as each pilot peeled off to make a dive bombing attack on the southwest section of the barracks area, dropping 500-pounders on them. As 2d Lt. Melvin J. Norton pulled out of his dive after releasing his bomb on the target, the engine on his P–40 was hit by ground fire. With his engine smoking, the lieutenant headed off in a northern direction in an effort to reach the Chinese border, fifty-five miles away. But when it proved impossible for his plane to reach the border, Norton opened his canopy and safely bailed out of his plane. His Shark crashed in flames into a hill slope near the village of Thai Binh, some ten miles northeast of a larger Bien Dong village.26


(Right) Attempted escape route of Lt. Norton.

Norton opened his canopy and safely bailed out of his plane.
The twenty-one-year old Norton could not have picked a better location in Tonkin to parachute into. Named the “High Region,” the area where he landed was wild, rugged, and jungle-covered with very few inhabitants. The region had also been the historic hiding place for Chinese pirates on the run from the French army. Norton, too, was a strong man, 5-foot, 10-inches tall, physically fit with remarkable stamina, able to adapt easily to the demands of escape and evasion. Originally from Salt Lake City, Utah, Norton’s family had moved to Roanoke, Virginia in 1936 to help run a family-operated farm. He graduated in 1940 from Andrew Lewis High School in nearby Salem. After his graduation, he followed his family, which had already moved to Pima, Arizona, and soon entered Gila Junior College in Thatcher. A well-known and popular student, the brown-haired, hazel-eyed Norton immediately signed up for Civilian Pilot Training at the college. “He loved to fly,” his sister recalled, “he lived to fly.” As soon as he received his pilot’s license the next year, he volunteered for the Army Air Corps on August 5, 1942. After distinguishing himself as an aerial gunner flying P-40 Sharks, he graduated as a second lieutenant with Class 43D on April 29, 1943. The next month, he shipped overseas to join the 26th Fighter Squadron in General Claire Chennault’s Fourteenth Air Force. In China he flew 18 missions, beginning on November 5, 1943. The mission to Luc Nam on March 9 was Norton’s nineteenth.

After he bailed out, Norton was helped in his evasion by the fact that the first French report of the plane crash wrongly put the Shark and Norton six miles north of the village of An Chau, not Thai Binh.

Marcel Rouilly, the Vichy Resident of Bac Giang province, alerted his superior, the Resident Superior of Tonkin, that a pilot had been downed in his area and that he had ordered all the military authorities in the region to search for the pilot. Rouilly had previously surrendered an American fighter pilot to French Army officers in Hanoi in keeping with Decoux’s orders. That flier had been given up to the Japanese.

A detachment of Vietnamese Guards from the post at An Chau was assembled by a Deputy Inspector of the guard, Maj. Armand Jourdan. His detachment began a methodical but fruitless search for the plane and its pilot far to the west of Thai Binh where the plane and Norton really went down. One group of partisans under a Tri Phu, or district chief, from the village of Son Dong north of Lam was assigned to search the Bien Dong area for the crashed P-40. Another French patrol and a partisan detachment were sent out from Dinh Lap, south of the French fort at Lang Son near the Chinese frontier. Sentries were placed on all routes out of the area into the Lang Son region. A Japanese detachment from the Kep Ha airbase also joined the search. Looking in the wrong area, none of the search parties were able to find the American pilot or his downed P-40.

The burned carcass of Norton’s Shark was finally located late the next day, March 10, by the Tri Phu’s partisans near the village of Thai Binh.

Meanwhile, Rouilly received a number of frantic messages from Admiral Decoux insisting that Rouilly “retrieve” Norton as quickly as possible. Based on the tone of those messages, Rouilly suspected that Decoux was under strong pressure from the Japanese military command at Hanoi to find the downed pilot.

But none of the search groups uncovered any trace of Norton for the next three days until he was finally spotted at dusk near the village of Ban Nuc, some six miles south of Dinh Lap. The partisans gave chase but as they closed on the pilot, he fired one shot at them with his .45-caliber automatic. When they returned his fire, Norton disappeared into a dense forest, taking advantage of nightfall. During the night, a heavy downpour of rain erased his tracks.

The next night, Norton took refuge in a hut in the village of Na Khua, to the east of Khe Giam village located on Inter-provincial Route No. 13, about fifteen miles south of Dinh Lap. While Norton was eating, the chief of the village sent a messenger to bring back to Na Khua a Tong Dong, a Vietnamese sergeant in charge of a partisan detachment at nearby Huu San.

The Vietnamese sergeant arrived at Na Khua during the night and entered the hut where Norton was staying. Startled, the lieutenant shot the sergeant and killed him instantly, undoubtedly thinking that the sergeant was Japanese. The partisan chief was dressed in Japanese-looking military clothes and was wearing a hat with a star on it. Norton then bolted back out into the night and into the forest behind the village.

The chief of the Na Khua village immediately sent a messenger to the Vietnamese Guard post at An Chau to alert Inspector Jourdan, who forwarded the information on to Resident Rouilly. Rouilly quickly ordered Jourdan to take his guards into the bush to look for Norton and ordered the chief of the Son Dong district to add his partisans to Jourdan’s detachment. American Intelligence later was informed that Jourdan had instructed his guards to take Norton “dead or alive.”

Jourdan and his detachment of guards surrounded the forest where Norton was thought to be hiding. At 7 a.m. the next morning, the Jourdan search party began a thorough search of one section of the forest while a Japanese detachment from the garrison at Lam scouted another site. Spotting the Japanese column on his trail, Norton slipped out of the forest and took refuge in a wooded area east of the hamlet of Kha Boun. This time, however, Jourdan, his guardsmen, and the partisans picked up the pilot’s trail through the vegetation and followed him into a small valley.

Leading three of his guards, Jourdan approached Norton silently until he was within fifteen yards of the pilot. The Vichy major called out to the pilot in French to surrender. Norton did not respond.

Jourdan later reported that he ordered his
three guards to fire a volley into the branches of a nearby tree as a warning that it was folly for the pilot to resist. Norton instead sprinted about ten yards away up onto a small hill and took cover behind the foot of a tree. The search party, however, could see his head and one arm.

Jourdan again called out to Norton to surrender. More silence.

The Vichy inspector called up his reinforcements—four riflemen—and sent them around the back of the small hill where Norton was hiding so that the American would see that he was surrounded.

Jourdan then walked towards the pilot, calling for him to give up and promising that the French would protect him if he did so. Norton replied by opening fire with his forty-five. When Norton began firing, the Vietnamese Guard and partisans immediately fired another volley, this time at the American.

After more French reinforcements arrived, a French sergeant crawled to within a few feet of Norton, then called out that Norton was dead. Norton had been hit by a bullet in the temple; his pistol was still in his hand.

In order to cover up any French culpability in the death of the American, Rouilly reported to his superiors that Norton had committed suicide rather than surrender to the search party. This version was later broadcast over Radio Tokyo by the Japanese. Rouilly repeated that account after the soldiers killing him had been ordered to shoot American fliers on sight if they were found on Vietnamese soil. Still another rumor alleged Norton had been killed because the Vichy authorities had put a 200 piastre reward on the heads of all downed pilots.

Consequences

A year after the war ended, the Adjutant General of the Army informed the Norton family in Pima, Arizona, that the army had learned that Norton had died on March 16, 1944, not March 24 as had been previously reported. According to the Adjutant General's account, Norton had succeeded in avoiding capture until he was surrounded on March 16, 1944. Norton fired on his pursuers and killed "the native officer who was in charge of the searching party." After the searchers returned fire, there was no return fire from the lieutenant. The searches found him dead.

The Adjutant General's account reflected one of a number of versions about the death of Lieutenant Norton that reached the Fourteenth Air Force after April. According to another version found in the records of the 23d Fighter Group, Norton had been rescued by the French underground and hidden for three days. However, the Japanese heard he was in French hands and demanded that the French army turn him over to them. In order to avoid revealing the existence of the underground, Norton was handed over. Later the underground heard he had been shot. A former 26th Fighter Squadron pilot recalled still a different account:

The talk around the ready room was that Norton had been killed by a firing squad and we were incensed about it. The story was that he had given the pursuing troops a good running battle, western cowboy style, before he was captured and killed. I think he must have been one of the pilots who carried an extra issue .45 automatic in his parachute jungle pack because part of the story was he had been firing with both hands during the pursuit (exaggerated gossip?)...
called for the wholesale execution of all Vichy collaborators in Vietnam.\(^{35}\) The captain refused to cooperate with the French army underground which he considered pro-Vichy, guilty of collaborating with the Japanese, and (wrongly) under the control of the Sûreté or Deuxième Bureau. Mingant objected to "the about-face of certain leaders who, formerly notorious Vichystes are now throwing themselves too visibly into the pro-Allied movement and at its head." \(^{36}\) Mingant consequently seized on the death of Norton to discredit his personal enemies in the French army underground. \(^{36}\) He informed the American command that Norton had been turned over to the Vichy Resident of Bac Giang province, Rouilly, and Rouilly’s military subordinate, Jourdan. The two Vichy officers surrendered the pilot to Japanese military authorities as requested. The Japanese then tortured him and killed him. Yet another version found in Fourteenth Air Force records, probably also provided by Mingant, stated Norton was "beaten to death by French police chief (vichy)," possibly a reference to Jourdan. \(^{37}\)

Reprisal

In the wake of the death of Lieutenant Norton, strong pressure was put on Decoux to change his policy by the commander in chief of the French army in Vietnam, General Eugène Mordant. \(^{38}\) Mordant was convinced that the Fourteenth Air Force had deliberately bombed Hanoi in December 1943, \(^{39}\) and again in April 1944 in retaliation for the admiral’s policy toward downed American fliers. \(^{40}\) On December 10 and 12, 1943, Hanoi (and not the usual target—the Japanese airfield at Gia Lam five miles outside Hanoi) had been attacked for the first time, causing 1,232 casualties and 500 deaths. On April 8, 1944, Hanoi was hit again by the 308th Bomb Group (H): nine soldiers were killed and fourteen wounded. After hitting an Annamite hospital in the Yersin hospital complex (where the bombs seriously injured several patients and killed some Annamite nurses), forty-six civilians were killed and 141 were wounded in the Vietnamese and Chinese residential areas. Mordant’s fears were supported by a warning from Fourteenth Air Force commander, Claire Chennault, who sent word to the Vichy authorities that the Fourteenth would bomb all the major towns in Tonkin if similar incidents occurred in the future. \(^{41}\) An OSS report confirmed the threat: "Allied planes dropped handbills on to Anchau and its vicinity, warning the Annamites that if American aviators will be ill-treated by them again, bombing will be affected by revenge." \(^{42}\) The text of another leaflet was translated into Annamese by OSS agent (and former missionary in Vietnam) W. A. Pruett and read: "To the Village of LANG-BANG and adjacent Villages: O foolish people! As you wish then!! If you had been willing to succour [sic] our American pilot you should certainly have received a reward. But, because of cowardice, you did not deign to succour him, therefore if this happens again, we shall be compelled to destroy your villages and towns." \(^{43}\)

Decoux also came under pressure from his personal staff, who saw that the end of Vichy was inevitable after the Allied landings in France on June 6, 1944. The admiral finally gave in and drafted a new directive, No. 10,287-CM, on June 26. In that directive, Allied fliers shot down in Vietnam would no longer be surrendered on the spot, or on demand, to the Japanese. Instead the downed fliers would be taken as quickly and as secretly as possible to the nearest army divisional headquarters for internment. \(^{44}\)

The directive from Decoux came too late to prevent General Chennault from carrying out his threat to retaliate for the death of Lieutenant Norton. On July 1, an “official” raid was conducted by Norton’s unit against a bridge and a railroad yard at Phu Lang Thuong, \(^{45}\) the town where Rouilly had his office. After briefing the pilots on their objective, the 51st Fighter Group intelligence officer took aside 26th Fighter Squadron First Lt. John M. Machin and gave him additional instructions. Years later, Machin recalled what those instructions were:

Some time later when I was in Nanning, the Group (51st) Intelligence officer told me about the proposed mission. He was very secretive about it. We talked away from the other pilots’ hearing and he showed me pictures of a building I understood was a residence. All I recall was a white wall and a window with curtains in it. I marveled that photo planes could take such detailed close up pictures. He said that Rouilly would be in that room at a certain time tomorrow morning and that we would be there to greet him. I was thrilled to be picked to go on this mission of vengeance. I don’t remember anyone else on the flight…. I do remember getting together with the armorer and getting him to load two frag clusters on my plane. I don’t think the other planes were so loaded. \(^{46}\)

The intelligence officer added “that the French officers never took cover because of the numerous over flights by bombers returning from aborted missions dropping their undelivered loads on the said bridge and the photo planes doing recons on the area.”

After the other pilots carried out their “official” mission, Machin implemented his secret orders and dropped his anti-personnel bombs in a low level attack on Rouilly’s residency, severely damaging it. Machin finished off his attack by strafing the rooms of the residency and surrounding area with machine gun fire. “I remember nothing else about the mission now except the joy I felt seeing the same window and wall I saw in the personal briefing picture shatter and crumble during the strafing run.” Machin recalled, “It was the only time during my war years that I felt it was a personal and not an anonymous battle.”

Machin’s aim was true. Rouilly was hit twice and he was rushed to the Lanessan Hospital in Hanoi and operated on immediately. After a two
AIR POWER

VIETNAM

FLIERS SHOT AMERICAN RESCUE EFFORT TO CONCERTED BEGAN THEREAFTER GROUND UNDER-CIVILIAN AND THE ARMY

VIETNAM DELEGATE IN GOVERN-DE GAULLE BECAME THE GENERAL

REGRETTERS BUT HE MAY LIVE. MORALE EFFECT EXCELENT [sic] AND SUGGEST GOOD FOLLOW UP STRAFING NATIVE GUARD BARRACKS AT ANCHAU REPEAT ANCHAU WHERE CO [COMMANDING OFFICER?] JOURDAN REPEAT CO JOURDAN LIVES, HE WAS PRESENT DEATH LT. NORTON REPEAT NORTON. HARD TO MISS JOURDAN AS ONLY LARGE MILDING [sic] IN ANCHAU REPEAT ANCHAU. 47

HAPPY TO REPORT RESIDENT ROUILLY REPEAT ROUILLY TWICE WOUNDED ON JULY 1ST. WILLIAMS FOR GORDON S[I/G][NE]/D SMITH. REGRETTING BUT HE MAY LIVE. MORALE EFFECT EXCELENT [sic] AND SUGGEST GOOD FOLLOW UP STRAFING NATIVE GUARD BARRACKS AT ANCHAU REPEAT ANCHAU WHERE CO [COMMANDING OFFICER?] JOURDAN REPEAT CO JOURDAN LIVES, HE WAS PRESENT DEATH LT. NORTON REPEAT NORTON. HARD TO MISS JOURDAN AS ONLY LARGE MILDING [sic] IN ANCHAU REPEAT ANCHAU. 47

The 26th Fighter Squadron’s attempt to kill Rouilly “scared hell out of all Japans [sic] and Vichyites,” according to another Fourteenth Air Force report,48 while Decoux visited the administrator in the hospital and was reportedly badly shaken. A message sent to the Fourteenth Air Force indicated what happened next: “… French source B2. Admiral Decoux called on Resident Rouilly [sic] in hospital, and personally modified instructions relative American airmen shot down in FIC repeat French Indochina. …”49 The French report, probably from Captain Mingant, however, was mistaken. The change in policy referred to in the cable was Decoux’s change of policy of June 26 that had been made after the death of Lieutenant Norton but before the attack on Rouilly took place.

Summary

After the death of Lieutenant Norton, no more Americans fliers were turned over to the Japanese by the Vichy authorities in Vietnam. A secret underground organization in the French colonial army in Vietnam had already taken matters into its own hands and affected the first rescue of an American pilot in April without Decoux’s knowledge.50 (Technically the first rescue from Vietnam was not of a downed American flier, but a British South African prisoner of war, Gunner Basil Bancroft, who had escaped from the Saigon prison camp on September 8, 1943. He arrived at the border at the same time as the downed American pilot.)51

Even though Decoux had changed his policy after the death of Lieutenant Norton, he still pleaded with de Gaulle’s provisional government (that had replaced the Vichy government and was installed at Paris in August) that he be allowed to continue his policy of placating the Japanese until they voluntarily withdrew from Vietnam.52 The admiral instead was stripped of his powers as governor general by Paris but he was ordered to maintain his post as a figurehead in order to deceive the Japanese. Real power thereafter rested with General Mordant, who became the de Gaulle government’s delegate in Vietnam and the head of all resistance and underground activities.53 The army and a civilian underground thereafter began a concerted effort to rescue American fliers shot down over Vietnam. Admiral Decoux was compelled by Mordant to issue a new directive at the end of 1944 prohibiting the surrender to the Japanese of American fliers downed in Indochina “under any pretext.”54

Norton’s death resulted in the rescue of thirty-two downed fliers in Vietnam; though not all were saved by the French underground.55 In September 1944, a P–40 pilot went down close to where Norton had killed the Vietnamese sergeant. Although the villagers searched for the pilot frantically, the American was helped to escape by two Chinese farmers, possibly for a reward offered by the Fourteenth Air Force.56 Though the trio did not know it, French rescue teams and intelligence officers watched over and protected their escape route to China.57 Two American fighter pilots were helped to escape from the Lanessan Hospital in Hanoi between October 1944 and January 1945.58 The three Gaullist officers, Robert, Labussière, and Boule, who had been imprisoned in 1941 and 1942 by Decoux, were also helped to escape from the central prison at Saigon in October 1944.59 The next month P–51 pilot Lt. Rudolph “Rudy” Shaw went down in northern Tonkin and was picked up by a unit of the Communist Nationalist Viet Minh organization. He was held for a month while the leader of the Viet Minh, Ho Chi Minh, prepared an appeal to the United States for help in ending French rule over Vietnam, signing Rudy’s name to it. Ho’s propaganda report was so unbelievable and unrealistic that Ho’s movement was ignored at the time by the Fourteenth Air Force after a brief flurry of interest in the Viet Minh.50 (Shaw’s account of what happened to him is at variance with what Ho Chi Minh claimed happened to him.) In 1998, when “Rudy” was shown a copy of the report attributed to him, he denied writing it.51 On November 20 another British POW was helped to escape from the Saigon camp by the underground. He was hidden at Kontum, Vietnam, and eventually escaped to China with the aid of a French army cook also hiding at Kontum. The cook had killed a Japanese soldier in a bar fight.52 Eight days later, a 16th Fighter Squadron P–51 pilot was rescued by a Chinese guerrilla leader, “King Dow,” who administered some “3,000 families in 100 villages on both sides of the frontier.”53 On Boxer Day, 1944, the 17th Pursuit Squadron pilot from the Philippines, who had been captured at Tourane in March 1942, escaped from the Saigon POW camp and was taken back to Tourane by the underground.54 This time he was feted by the same soldiers who had turned him over to the Japanese two years before. The flier next joined a Free French commando unit in Laos but was wounded so severely in an attack on a...
Japanese-held bridge at Ban Ban that he had to be left behind. The former American POW recovered from his wounds, however, and was able to walk out of Laos into China, arriving the day after the war ended. Four members of a crew aboard a B–25 bomber, named “Bobcat,” shot down on January 1, 1945, were aided to escape to China. Before they were escorted back to the border, two of the crewmen were treated to a tour of Japanese targets in Hanoi by French army intelligence officers and then taken to a Hanoi cinema where, sitting side-by-side with Japanese soldiers, they watched a Dagwood and Blondie movie. Two other sergeants from the same crew were treated for their injuries secretly at the Lanessan Hospital and then hidden from the Japanese in a Foreign Legion camp at Ba Vi, outside Hanoi. The remaining three crew members from the “Bobcat” were taken prisoners immediately by the Japanese; the French underground was unable to help them. One crewman claimed the Viet Minh had turned him over to the Japanese.

Six navy aviators were shot down on January 12, 1945, over Saigon during Task Force 38’s daring...
raid against Japanese targets in southern Vietnam. All six fliers were picked up by French military authorities and housed in the central French prison of Saigon for safe keeping.70

Despite enormous pressure from the Japanese to surrender the men to them, Decoux refused, claiming for the first time that the navy fliers had committed acts of war against Vietnam by sinking the French light cruiser, Lamotte-Picquet, and other French vessels during the task force attack.71 When French army intelligence learned that the Japanese were preparing to storm the prison to take the men by force, the men were spirited out of the prison and were taken to the Legionnaire camp at Ba Vi southwest of Hanoi where they joined the two “Bobcat” sergeants.72 Capt. (later General) Jacques Beauvallet paid a personal price for protecting the naval fliers in Saigon. He was horribly tortured by the Japanese who were trying to find out what happened to the Americans he saved.73

A seventh navy pilot from Task Force 38 was shot down during the raid and found by the underground. The flier was hidden outside Saigon and sneaked back into the city nightly so he could be treated for severe burns. When he recovered, he joined a ten-man crew from a Navy PBM that crashed near Qui Nhon on January 26.74 One member of that crew was helped by the underground to board an American submarine that had been sent specially to pick up the crew.75 Rather than evacuate the other crewmen on another submarine at a later date, the head of the Tourane civilian underground network took the crew to a make-shift airstrip near Pleiku where he hoped they could be flown out. A French army officer later charged that the underground leader had moved the crew in order to receive a reward from the Americans for rescuing the men.76 That proved to be a fatal mistake.

A Fourteenth Air Force bomber also went down in Tonkin on February 11. Only one crewman managed to jump as the bomber flew over Moncay and sneaked back into the city nightly so he could be treated for severe burns. When he recovered, he joined a ten-man crew from a Navy PBM that crashed near Qui Nhon on January 26.74 One member of that crew was helped by the underground to board an American submarine that had been sent specially to pick up the crew.75 Rather than evacuate the other crewmen on another submarine at a later date, the head of the Tourane civilian underground network took the crew to a make-shift airstrip near Pleiku where he hoped they could be flown out. A French army officer later charged that the underground leader had moved the crew in order to receive a reward from the Americans for rescuing the men.76 That proved to be a fatal mistake.

The French Army in Vietnam was easily destroyed; its soldiers were executed or imprisoned and tortured. Mordant and Decoux were imprisoned as well.82

The rescue and escape of more Allied airmen from Vietnam by the French underground died with the Japanese attack, though eight more fliers—the two air force aviators and six Task Force 38 fliers at Ba Vi—were helped to escape after the coup before all French resistance was crushed by the Japanese. A major from the 26th Fighter Squadron, who was downed near Hanoi just before the coup, joined a university resistance group that had attacked a Japanese police station, ambushed a Japanese truck convoy, and fought its way out of Hanoi.80 The major was taken to Son La and flown to China in a decrepit Potez-25, whose aged canvas “skin cracked at the touch.” The major’s French pilot, Lt. Hubert Coquard, crashed on his return flight to Dien Bien Phu and disappeared.84 The Fourteenth Air Force had learned from Coquard that the Task Force 38 fliers were being taken to a primitive landing strip at Dien Bien Phu by the French Foreign Legion. En route to the airfield, the men were rescued by a Legion sergeant who led them to safety after the Legion company they were with was ambushed by the Japanese. A Fourteenth Air Force C–47 was sent to the landing strip and picked the men up a few days before the Japanese seized the airfield.

In the confusion following the Japanese attack, not all rescue efforts were successful. One of the Ba Vi “Bobcat” sergeants had to be left behind by the Task Force 38 fliers due to his broken ankle. The American was later picked up by another Legion sergeant, who tried to save the crippled flier by taking him to China on horseback. But both men were captured by the Japanese near the Chinese border, almost within sight of safety. By posing as a Hungarian Legionnaire, the American sergeant was imprisoned by the Japanese in what later came to be known as the “Hanoi Hilton” along with other Legion prisoners. The “Bobcat” sergeant survived the war.85

The remaining Task Force 38 pilot and the Navy’s ten-man PBM crew hiding near Plei Ku were betrayed to the Japanese for a reward by a Moi soldier. The pilot died in an ensuing firefight and all but two of the other naval fliers were executed by the Japanese.86 The Japanese commander, who directed the executions, was himself executed as a war criminal after the war.87 The head of the Tourane underground network and the PBM’s two pilots had separated from the group before the ambush. They were captured a short time later, imprisoned at Hué, and were executed before the war ended. Their bodies are still missing and their executioners escaped Allied justice.88

The last American flier downed in Vietnam after the Japanese coup was a P–38 pilot from the 449th Fighter Squadron. He was picked up by a Viet Minh group on July 7, 1945, which then held him for ransom. Once the war ended, however, he was rescued by Chinese Nationalist soldiers on September 5, 1945, just as the Viet Minh unit was on the verge of executing him.89

THE JAPANESE COULD NO LONGER TRUST DECOUX TO CONTROL HIS SUBORDINATES ... THE JAPANESE EXECUTED A SWIFT COUP

THE FRENCH ARMY IN VIETNAM WAS EASILY DESTROYED; ITS SOLDIERS WERE EXECUTED OR IMPRISONED AND TORTURED. MORDANT AND DECOUX WERE IMPRISONED AS WELL
The death of 16th Fighter Squadron pilot Lieutenant Melvin Norton thus had important repercussions in Vietnam. His death played a role in forcing Decoux to change his policy of turning over American fliers to the Japanese, thereby enabling twenty-nine American fliers to escape to safety in China. But the Japanese later used Decoux’s failure to surrender downed fliers to them as a pretext to overthrow his government on March 9, 1945, an act that changed forever the history of that country. As Stein Tønnesson noted in his study of the Vietnamese revolution of 1945 the destruction of the French administration and army in Vietnam created a vacuum that enabled Hồ and the Viet Minh to seize power following the capitulation of Japan.40 French rule over Vietnam was never the same thereafter.

NOTES


17. Legrand, L’Indochine, 150 N(1).


22. Ibid., Ch. 9.


24. Lettre No. 65 à Résident Supérieur de Tonkin (J. Haelwyn), “Entry of 17-4-1944 Monday, 197; Claude de Boisanger, “Note,” No. 937-DN1/2, Avril 22, 1944, Carton 10 H 81, SHAT.


August 1948, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, U.S. Department of the Army. Unless otherwise noted, the account of Norton’s efforts to escape and his death are taken from this file.


29. Decoux No. 227 Diplom à Monsieur le Résident de France à Lang Son (Bon fils). Hanoi, 20 mai 1944, COM REP 860-29, AOM; Haussaire (Decoux) No. 2343/SP3 A CHEF POST TA LANG — Pour FRANCLUCAT LONGTCHEOU (Siguret), Hanoi, 5 avril 1944, Ibid.


33. [Handwritten Note], unsigned, undated, “23RD FIGHTER GP,” GP-23-SU, 1943-1944, Frame #2317, Microfilm No. B0091, AFHRA.


36. “Subject: setting up Post at Tsinger,” Larson Memorandum to Wight, March 31, 1944, courtesy of Robert Larson.

37. Holtz, “Situation in French Indochina” File No. 862-609-1, AFHRA.


43. “O.W.I. Pamphlet in Annamese,” W. A. Pruett, New York, June 1, 1944, Folder Pruett, Folder # 3, Box 235, Entry 210, RG 226, NARA.


48. Holtz, “Situation in French Indochina,” File No. 862.609-1, AFHRA.


51. AGAS-China, Hq. Y Force, APO 627 c/o PM NYC, 17 April 1944. Ibid. “Entry of April 4, 1944,” AGAS-China Calendar, Folder “AGAS Journal,” Box 20, RG 319 (G-2 Intelligence), NARA.


54. Cited in Legrand, L’Indochine, 250 Note.


56. Charles Fenn, At the Dragon’s Gate With the OSS in the Far East (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2004), 57-63.


61. Interview with “Rudy” Shaw, 12 October 1998.


65. L-H. Ayrolles (Serres), L’Indochine ne répond plus (Saint-Brieuc: Armand Prud’hon, 1948), Ch. VIII.

66. “Subject: Evasion Report of the Crew of B-24 No. 44-
AIR POWER History / FALL 2008

40782, 373d Bombardment Squadron” and “Mission 460: Snoopier Strike Mission of the South China Sea and Tonkin Gulf” To: Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force, 1 January 1945, File No. GP-308-SU-OP, Nov-Dec 1944, Headquarters 308th Bombardment Group, Office of the Commanding Officer, File No. GP 308 HI (Bomb) 14 Sept 1942-Dec 44, AFHRA.


69. Interview with former Sergeant and POW William H. Gotschall, November 7, 1995; “Note for the Admiral,” 26 January 1945, Intendance de Police, Hanoi, COMREP CM 187, AOM.


71. Goucoch (Saigon) Telegram No. 281-SPA, à Haussaire, 15 janvier 1945, COMREP CM 187, AOM. Haussaire Telegraph No. 195/SPD to Goucoch (Saigon), 16 janvier 1945, Radio.


77. “Evasion Strafford, William H. 1st Lt, 0-805217, 308th BM SQD, 373d BM SQD,” Entry of 7-3-1945


87. Interview with former Sergeant and POW William H. Gotschall, November 7, 1995; “Note for the Admiral,” 26 January 1945, Intendance de Police, Hanoi, COMREP CM 187, AOM.


OPERATION VITTLES: A NAM
ME FOR THE BERLIN AIRLIFT

Roger G. Miller
It may seem an item of little import, or possibly a reflection of excessive obsession with military trivia, but the story of how the American effort on the Berlin Airlift of 1948-1949 received its name, "Operation Vittles," is of historical interest.

The traditional story is well known to those familiar with the airlift. The name has always been attributed to the first commander of the operation, Brig. Gen. Joseph Smith. A 1923 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Joe Smith was a plainspoken, down-to-earth airman who had begun military service in the cavalry, then traded his horse for an airplane, transferring to the U.S. Army Air Corps in 1928. He had been one of the pilots who flew the airmail in 1924 when the Air Corps had briefly undertaken that task, and later he found his niche in strategic bombardment. During World War II, Smith had served in important staff and planning positions. He was a senior air member of the Joint War Plans Committee under the Joint Chiefs of Staff and chief of staff of XXth Bomber Command conducting Boeing B–29 Superfortress operations in the China-Burma-India Theater. He ended the war as deputy chief of staff of Eighth Air Force. On June 24, 1948, when the Soviet Union established a blockade of the surface routes into the city of Berlin in occupied Germany, General Smith was the commander of Wiesbaden Military Post in the American Occupation Zone. On June 26, the U.S. and Great Britain resorted to airlift to supply the blockaded city with necessities, and on June 29 Lt. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, commander of the United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), appointed Smith temporary commander of the “Berlin Airlift Task Force.” General Smith served in that position until July 28, when the permanent airlift commander, Maj. Gen. William H. Tunner, arrived from the United States. During his month as temporary commander, Joe Smith established many of the regulations and procedures that ultimately made the airlift successful.1

Among the decisions attributed to General Smith was the selection of the name Operation Vittles. This story appeared in print for the first time in an article on the Berlin Airlift in the fall 1948 issue of The Bee-Hive, the official magazine of United Aircraft Corporation. In this account, Paul Fisher, the corporation’s head of public affairs, wrote that during the first few days of the airlift someone had suggested that the operation be called “Operation Lifeline” or “Operation Airlane.” However, General Smith found those suggestions pretentious. Fisher attributed to the general a blunt, off the cuff response: “‘Hell’s fire,’ said General Smith, ‘we’re hauling grub, I understood. Call it Vittles if you have to have a name.’ And Vittles it became. The British were equally in character; they named their part of the show Operation Plane Fare.”2 The implication of The Bee-Hive story was that General Smith informally named the airlift, and that he casually pulled the name off the top of his head.

Roger G. Miller is Senior Historian for the Air Force Historical Studies Office, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. Dr. Miller earned degrees at North Texas State University, and his doctorate at Indiana University, in Bloomington. Dr. Miller entered the Air Force history program in 1980. He has served as a historian at Lowry Technical Training Center, Denver, Colorado; HQ Air Training Command, Texas; HQ, 17th Air Force, Federal Republic of Germany; and HQ, U.S. Air Force in Washington, D.C. Dr. Miller writes, publishes, and lectures widely on many aspects of history. His primary areas of interest include air logistics, air transportation, and early military aviation history. Dr. Miller’s book, To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948-1949, was published by Texas A&M University Press in November 2000, and his articles and reviews have appeared in numerous professional journals. His contributions to the Air Force History monograph series include A Preliminary to War: The 1st Aero Squadron and the Mexican Punitive Expedition of 1916 and Billy Mitchell: Stormy Petrel of the Air, both published in 2004. His most recent contribution to the monograph series is “Like a Thunderbolt”: The Lafayette Escadrille and the Advent of American Pursuit in World War I published in 2007.

48

AIR POWER History / FALL 2008
Fisher’s article lacked citations, thus the source for his account of the Smith story is uncertain. When he visited the airlift sometime in late August or early September 1948, Fisher interviewed several individuals, but these were specifically identified in the article. He was vague about General Smith. Two words quoted above, “I understood,” could be read in a manner that suggested that he heard the story directly from the general, but the wording of the rest of the article casts some doubt that a face-to-face interview took place. Fisher did talk to at least one officer in Smith’s headquarters, a Maj. Edward Willeford, thus the account may be second-hand. No matter. It was a neat, concise, vigorous story, and proved irresistible.3

In 1964, Lt. Gen. William Tunner’s autobiography, Over the Hump, paraphrased the Smith story in Bee-Hive closely: “During those first early days an attempt was made to glamorize the airlift with a fancy name: ‘Hell’s fire,’ Smith said, ‘we’re hauling grub. Call it Operation Vittles.’ The British sneaked in a pun on their title: Operation Plain Fare.”4 The story as presented in the Tunner book failed to mention any other code names and omitted a source, but the similarity in language verifies
that it was taken from Fisher. *Over the Hump* was a well-written, colorful account of Tunner’s experiences with Air Transport Command in the early days of World War II; the Hump airlift in the China-Burma-India Theater later in the war; the Combined Airlift Task Force during the Berlin Airlift; and Combat Cargo Command during the Korean War. The book rapidly became a classic in air power history and a popular source of information on the development of military air transportation.5

Virtually every subsequent history of the Berlin Airlift that addressed the origin of the term Vittles used a variation of the account as it appeared in Fisher’s article or as presented in Tunner’s narrative. Among the most prominent, Frank Donovan’s 1968 *Bridge in the Sky* drew extensively on Tunner, though in his particular
case he did not credit anyone with naming Vittles. Ten years later, Richard Collier in Bridge Across the Sky quoted Smith’s response verbatim as it appeared in The Bee-Hive. Thomas Parrish’s 1998 account, Berlin in the Balance, varied slightly from previous versions, but cited Tunner as its source. Seemingly out of the blue, however, Parrish added “Operation Manna” to the list of alternative names for the airlift, a name that did not appear in Over the Hump. Michael Haydock’s City Under Siege, published in 1999, quoted Smith word-for-word as in Tunner. Oddly enough, one of the most detailed and respected histories of the airlift, Ann and John Tusa’s The Berlin Airlift, failed to give any account of how the operational names originated, and completely ignored General Smith’s contributions to the airlift.5

In summary, the traditional story of the origin of the name Vittles dated from one publication, The Bee-Hive, but that account might be accepted with some reluctance given the author’s failure to identify the primary source of the information. The well-respected Over the Hump repeated the story in a slightly altered form later and helped spread it widely. The story was accepted uncritically by subsequent authors and restated often, albeit with minor variations in wording. As for the primary actor, General Smith himself apparently said little for the written record. During an oral history interview in 1976, the general affirmed parenthetically that he had called the airlift Vittles, but he provided no details to the interviewer.7

When I began research for To Save a City in 1996, I had no reason to doubt common knowledge concerning the origin of the name Operation Vittles. The story of how General Smith selected it was well established and seemed beyond cavil. Vittles had caught on quickly. It was in common usage on the airlift within a few days after the operation began. The name first appeared in print in the New York Times on July 3, 1948, in a story datelined the previous day. By the next day, it had ascended to the status of title of an article in the Times. The newspaper articles failed to identify General Smith as the source, however, attributing the name to “they” in the first article and to “the fliers” in the second.8

Surprisingly, early in my research, I began tripping over stories that offered a different origin for the name, or, at least, suggested a more complex story of its origin. Initially, more than one airlift veteran told me in casual conversation that the name Operation Vittles had originated from air transport activities in Europe before the airlift began. One of the veterans was a former pilot from the 61st Troop Carrier Group, Col. Harry D. Immel, USAF (Ret.), whose account later appeared in print.9 A 1998 article in The Retired Officer Magazine quoted Colonel Immel as saying: “Two squadrons of the 61st Troop Carrier Group, the 14th and 15th, became part of the European Air Transport Service, or EATS. That’s how the familiar name for the airlift evolved: Operation Vittles was derived from the first thing we called the airlift—‘eats.’”10 This origination seemed plausible on the surface, but perhaps a bit convenient. Also, the European Air Transportation Service, a provisional organization, had been disestablished in December 1947, over six months before the airlift began. Ultimately, I was unable to substantiate EATS as the source of the name Operation Vittles and came to believe that the claim was an inference suggested by the presence of the squadrons that had operated as the European Air Transport Service, the participation of the 61st Troop Carrier Group on the airlift, and the coincidence of the name, Operation Vittles. It was, in short, an urban legend of the Berlin Airlift, honestly believed by some participants.

In another instance, research in the Berlin Airlift files maintained by the Office of History of Air Mobility Command (AMC) at Scott AFB, Illinois, yielded documents created shortly after the airlift began. One was a draft plan for “Operation Manna” prepared at Headquarters Military Air Transport Service (MATS) on July 2, 1948. The plan described how MATS would “provide airlift of supplies from the U.S.-occupied Zone of Germany to the Western Sector of Berlin to support the blockaded U.S. forces.” In essence, this plan stated how HQ MATS would operate the airlift if it took over the operation from HQ USAFE. The plan was more than likely prepared by General Tunner’s office, since a memo from him to Maj. Gen. Laurence Kuter, the commander of MATS, enumerating the reasons that MATS should be in charge, was attached. The plan was probably created as part of Tunner’s unsuccessful campaign to have MATS placed in charge of the Berlin Airlift.11 A second document in the same file, excerpts from a typescript history of the 521st Air Transport Group at Brookley AFB, Alabama, asserted that the plan had been drafted but never distributed.12

Use of the name Operation Manna, confirmed that an alternative name to Operation Vittles had existed at some point, at least in HQ MATS, and might even have been applied had MATS taken charge of the airlift. USAFE, however, remained the responsible organization, even after MATS aircraft, equipment, and personnel began arriving in huge numbers and a MATS general, Tunner, took operational command. The two documents said nothing about the origin of the name Vittles itself, but they did authenticate the reference to Operation Manna that appeared in Parrish’s Berlin in the Balance mentioned above. During his research, Parrish had evidently seen the draft plan, found a reference to it, or discovered an equivalent document, although he had failed to cite whatever he had seen in his footnotes.13

While researching another aspect of the Berlin Crisis of 1948-1949, however, I came across an intriguing origin for the name Vittles. Shortly after the Berlin Airlift began, the United States, working closely with the United Kingdom, had deployed two groups of B–29 bombers, the 28th Bombardment Group from Rapid City AFB, South Dakota, and the 307th Bombardment Group from McDill AFB,
Florida, to air bases in England. At the time these aircraft deployed to England, the word quietly circulated that they were armed with atomic bombs. During my research, a variety of veterans, writers, and other individuals repeated that information. In a 1998 telephone call, in fact, a reporter told me that he had just talked to a veteran who had actually seen atomic bombs off loaded after the bombers reached their bases in England! The prevalence of this information indicated that the word was widely spread and commonly believed—these were “atomic bombers.” The problem, however, was that neither of these two bomb groups was nuclear-capable. B–29s required special modifications to carry an atomic bomb, and in July 1948 only one unit, the 509th Bombardment Group at Roswell AFB, New Mexico, possessed modified aircraft. The 509th remained in New Mexico during the Berlin Airlift.14

The persistence of the claims about nuclear weapons suggested either a wide-spread popular belief that all B–29s were atomic-capable, or indicated the possibility that perhaps the Defense Department had instituted a disinformation campaign, “leaking” the news that the bombers were nuclear armed in an effort to convince the Soviet Union that the two groups posed a greater deterrent than their numbers indicated. In an effort to verify this hypothesis about a disinformation campaign, I talked with planners and commanders who had served in the Pentagon in 1948.15

Among those veterans was Col. William R. Large, Jr., USAF (Ret.), of Dearborn, Ohio, who had been assigned to the Operations Division, Directorate of Plans and Operations (AFOPO), during June and July 1948. While discussing the question of nuclear-armed B–29s, the subject of the name Operation Vittles somehow came up. In a letter of August 3, 1998, Colonel Large asserted that the origin of Vittles was more prosaic than the traditional account. According to the colonel, the well-known cables sent by Gen. Lucius D. Clay, the U.S. military governor for Germany, and General LeMay requesting C–54s from the United States had caused a flurry of activity at U.S. Air Force headquarters in the Pentagon.16 On Sunday, June 27, the Operations Division alerted four C–54 squadrons by telephone to prepare for an immediate deployment to Germany on temporary duty. At the same time, personnel in the Operations Division prepared written orders to be dispatched to the units as soon as higher authorities approved the movement. These orders required a code name so that other organizations and such agencies as supply, personnel, transportation, and finance could identify their activities with the operation and its priority. A name was normally selected from the arbitrary list in an official code name book, but on that Sunday the book was unavailable. According to Colonel Large, Brig. Gen. Oliver S. Picher, Chief of the Operations Division, asked him for suggestions. Colonel Large responded that since the airlift would be delivering clothes and food, why not call it Operation “Victuals” but spell the word “Vittles,” because the term would be unfamiliar to the Russians.17

To anyone familiar with the U.S. Air Force procedures, Colonel Large’s account provided a logical origin for the code name Vittles. On the other hand, it was a self-serving claim requiring independent corroboration. Since General Smith was not assigned to temporary command of the airlift until June 29, and the setting of Colonel Large’s story was two days earlier, the use of the term in official
documents prior to the 29th would provide evidence that the name Vittles had a source outside General Smith. If a document came from the Pentagon and was dated June 27, it would provide reasonable support for Colonel Large’s story. If it came from Colonel Large’s office, it would provide substantial verification of his account. The most convincing proof, obviously, would be to locate one of the orders deploying the C–54 squadrons. If these made reference to Operation Vittles, one could be reasonably certain that the code name originated in the Operations Division at HQ USAF, as the colonel described. I added the deployment orders to my research wish list.

Further research in the succeeding weeks provided citations to two messages—they were HQ USAF to CG, Alaskan Air Command, June 27, 1948, WARX-84756, and HQ USAF to CG, TAC, June 27, 1948, WARX-84772—but failed to yield the documents themselves. Headquarters USAFE had produced detailed contemporary accounts of the Berlin Airlift, one covering 1948, the other 1949, and attached a reasonably large collection of supporting documents, but neither of the two messages was included. A check with the Office of History at USAFE established that what must have once been a large collection of Berlin Airlift documents had disappeared over time. The other most logical location, the Office of History at HQ Air Mobility Command, maintained an extremely valuable file of airlift documents, but the two messages were not in that file. Likewise, several searches at the National Archives proved fruitless. Ultimately, with deadlines pressing, I decided to use the original story of how General Smith named the airlift in To Save a City; to include Colonel Large’s alternative story as a possible origin; and to offer an explanation in a footnote.

Long after the book was published, my friend, Dr. Daniel F. Harrington, a historian in the Office of History at USAFE, found other pieces of evidence. Dan has studied post-World War II U.S. diplomacy in Europe for over thirty years and is an exceptional authority on the Berlin Crisis of 1948-1949. In 1996, we had considered collaborating on an official U.S. Air Force monograph on the Berlin Airlift in time for the 50th Anniversary two years later. For various reasons, this plan fell through, and I set out to write the monograph version of To Save a City on my own. Later, conditions changed and presented Dan with the opportunity to write his own monograph, the excellent official USAFE study entitled “The Air Force Can Deliver Anything.” Accordingly, during the next two years, we did collaborate, exchanging over two hundred e-mails posing questions, arguing interpretations, clarifying issues, and identifying obscure sources. Both monographs were published in 1998, but our interest in the Berlin Crisis and the Airlift continued during subsequent years as I prepared the commercial version of To Save a City, published in 2000, and as Dan continued research for his comprehensive diplomatic history of the period, yet to be published.

Dan first found supporting evidence for Colonel Large’s story in August 1998, when he rediscovered a 1962 memo written by Joseph Tustin, then USAFE historian. The memo read: “The Americans called the Berlin Airlift, ‘Operation Vittles.’ However, that was never its official name. The title was coined because the code name for sending C–54 aircraft from the United States, Tokio [sic], Hawaii, and Puerto Rico was called ‘Vittles.’ The airlift was already in progress before any C–54s arrived on the scene.” Tustin failed to provide a source for the statement, but, as Dan pointed out, it matched Colonel Large’s account quite well. What lent Tustin’s note verisimilitude was the fact that he had been in the USAFE history office in 1949 and 1950, when the detailed
accounts of the airlift mentioned above were written. Quite possibly, he saw copies of the original messages dispatching C–54s from the United States and his account originated from that experience. Tustin's statement supported Colonel Large's account, but was not really proof.

Then, on September 20, 2005, Dan e-mailed me: “By the way, your colonel was right. I found the 27 June C–54 deployment message that included the term ‘Vittles’.”20 Dan had found the document in the Gen. Lucius Clay papers located in Record Group 200 of donated materials at Archives II in College Park, Maryland. Clay had maintained a file of messages arranged chronologically and it was where one would expect to locate it, in a folder labeled “June 1948.”21 The citation, however, did not appear to describe one of the deployment orders that I originally sought. Other responsibilities as well as a lack of immediate requirement prevented me from visiting the National Archives for several months. When I did in February 2006, I found the message just as Dan had described.

Originally classified “Top Secret” and labeled “Eyes Only,” released jointly by the Chief of Staff, USAF, and the Director of Plans and Operations, the message informed Generals LeMay and Clay of the decisions regarding aircraft support for Germany made in Washington, D.C., on June 27th. Most of the information concerned the movement of bombers. Two squadrons of B–29s from the 301st Bombardment Group would transfer on the morning of June 28 to Goose Bay, Labrador, where they would remain on three-hour alert for movement to Fürstenfeldbruck, Germany. To back this deployment, in the United States one B–29 group would be placed on three-hour alert and a second group on forty-eight hour alert for movement to Europe, if necessary. Further, the message informed the two commanders that the question of basing two groups of B–29s at airfields in the United Kingdom would be raised with the British government and requested that Lord Tedder, the chief of the Royal Air Force, be contacted for clearance for the movement and to coordinate the selection of destinations for the two groups. In addition to the bombers, the U.S. Air Force was placing a fighter group of North American P–51 Mustangs on twenty-four hour alert for movement to Europe. However, the message informed the commanders, logistical concerns prevented advancing the deployment for the jet fighter group of Lockheed P–80 Shooting Stars, which was already scheduled for transfer to Germany from its base in the Caribbean.

As for transports, the message confirmed that four squadrons of C–54s from Alaska, Hawaii, the Caribbean, and Tactical Air Command had been ordered to Germany. The aircraft would fly individually, and each squadron would carry four spare engines and sufficient personnel to perform basic maintenance. Buried in the message, a key sentence specified that “MESSAGES OF MOVEMENT OF THESE AIRPLANES TO YOU WILL CONTAIN UNCLASSIFIED CODE WORD QUOTE VICTOR ITEM TARE TARE LOVE EASY SUGAR UNQUOTE PD.” The message added that an announcement would be made stating that these aircraft would be flying to Germany to assist in feeding the U.S. occupation sector in Berlin.22

This message from U.S. Air Force headquarters sent on June 27, 1948, verified Colonel Large’s basic story. Personnel in the Pentagon assigned the name Operation Vittles to the initial deployment of C–54s on June 27, two days before General Smith took temporary charge of the airlift in Germany. Further, Colonel Large was assigned to AFOPO,23 so his office created the message: possibly he might have written it. The message fell short of proving conclusively that Colonel Large personally selected the name Vittles exactly as he had described, but in history, absolute proof is seldom available, and one must often accept lesser levels of validation. In this case, I accept Colonel Large’s story and will do so until better evidence suggests a different scenario. I am confident, however, that the messages dispatching the four C–54 squadrons exist and will turn up some day, probably at the most unexpected time and in the most unlikely place. Perhaps someone reading this article has a copy of one “squirrel”-ed away in his personal files.

Does the existence of the June 27 AFOPO/AFCCS message to LeMay and Clay call General Smith’s story into question? The answer is, no. It must be emphasized that the message applied the code name Vittles only to the actual deployment of C–54s to Germany in July 1948. The message did not assign the term to the airlift itself. Accordingly, I accept General Smith’s assertion that he named Operation Vittles, and I believe that the traditional story of how it came about is generally true, although successive authors beginning with Fisher probably dressed it up for dramatic effect.

Further, I also believe that there was a direct connection. I believe—but cannot prove—that General Smith saw the June 27 message referring to the Vittles movement about the time that he took charge of the operation, and that the name, simple and descriptive, had stuck with him. Thus, when the question of what to call the airlift arose within the first three days of his command, General Smith, consciously or unconsciously, found a strikingly appropriate term ready in his mind and summoned it forth.

The irony to this story of the naming of Operation Vittles, of course, was that ultimately coal, not food became the primary cargo of the Berlin Airlift. Out of a total of 2,325,509 tons of cargo delivered to Berlin by the Combined Airlift Task Force, some 1,586,029 tons consisted of coal while only 536,705 tons comprised foodstuffs. But food deliveries began first; fuel came later. The first airplane load of coal only arrived in Berlin on July 7, twelve days after the Berlin Airlift officially began and at least five days after the name Vittles had been popularly accepted.24 It was impossible for anyone to anticipate that the airlift would ultimately deliver more coal than food during the first days of Operation VICTOR ITEM TARE TARE LOVE EASY SUGAR.


3. Fisher spelled the major’s name “Wilerford” in error. USAF rosters omit the “r.”

4. William H. Tuner, Over the Hump, (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1964), p. 159. The final version of the name for the British airlift effort was Operation Plainfare. Allegedly, some clerk failed to understand the play-on-words in Operation Plane Fare and changed the spelling. Subsequently, it was combined into one word and appeared that way in official documents and unofficial accounts. Tunner’s autobiography was ghost written by journalist Booton Hendon.


9. Colonel Immel was a senior pilot with the 61st Troop Carrier Group before the airlift began and, among other duties, had acted as personal pilot for Gen. Lucius Clay, the U.S. military governor for Germany. He was one of the few pilots who flew from the beginning to the end of the operation, accomplishing some 417 airlift missions. He made one of the earliest flights into Berlin, piloting a Boeing B–17 Flying Fortress carrying 2,000 pounds of flour in the bomb bay, and fifteen months later made the last official flight on September 30, 1949.


15. The author was unable to confirm that such a disarmament campaign existed. If one had, it would have been a forlorn effort. As became known later, one of the Cambridge spies, Donald MacLean, occupied key positions in the British Embassy in Washington, D.C., in 1948, as first secretary and as secretary on the Combined Policy Committee on Atomic Development. MacLean almost certainly knew the status of the conventionally armed bombers and reported that information to his Soviet masters. Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, Spy Book: The Encyclopedia of Espionage, rev. ed. (New York: Random House, 1998), pp. 547-49.

16. Msg UA 8561, COMGENUSAFE to Chief of Staff Air Force (EYES ONLY for Vandenberg), June 27, 1948, in Berlin Airlift Files, Office of History, HQ AMC.

17. Miller, To Save a City, p. 58.


19. E-mail msg, Harrington to Miller, subj: “Vittles,” Aug. 20, 1998, 8:22 a.m. (In author’s files). E-mail msg., Harrington to Miller, subj: Vittles Message, Sep. 21, 2005, 7:21 a.m. (In author’s files). A preliminary inquiry revealed a problem with the citation. Record Group 200 was no longer in use. Tim Nenninger, Chief, Modern Military Records, explained that while RG 200 was inactive; however, Archives II maintained fifteen boxes of donated Lucius Clay Papers in Stack 130. E-mail msg., Nenninger to Miller, subj: RE - Other - My Research Question Is Not Listed, Sep. 22, 2005, 11:06 a.m. (In author’s files).

20. E-mail msg., Harrington to Miller, subj: FW: Berlin Airlift as a Campaign, Sep. 20, 2005, 3:50 a.m. (In author’s files). E-mail msg., Harrington to Miller, subj: FW: Berlin Airlift as a Campaign, Sep. 20, 2005, 10:26 a.m.; E-mail msg., Harrington to Miller, subj: Vittles Message, Sep. 21, 2005, 7:21 a.m. (In author’s files) A preliminary inquiry revealed a problem with the citation. Record Group 200 was no longer in use. Tim Nenninger, Chief, Modern Military Records, explained that while RG 200 was inactive; however, Archives II maintained fifteen boxes of donated Lucius Clay Papers in Stack 130. E-mail msg., Nenninger to Miller, subj: RE - Other - My Research Question Is Not Listed, Sep. 22, 2005, 11:06 a.m. (In author’s files).

21. E-mail msg., Harrington to Miller, subj: FW: Berlin Airlift as a Campaign, Sep. 20, 2005, 10:26 a.m.; E-mail msg., Harrington to Miller, subj: Vittles Message, Sep. 21, 2005, 7:21 a.m. (In author’s files). A preliminary inquiry revealed a problem with the citation. Record Group 200 was no longer in use. Tim Nenninger, Chief, Modern Military Records, explained that while RG 200 was inactive; however, Archives II maintained fifteen boxes of donated Lucius Clay Papers in Stack 130. E-mail msg., Nenninger to Miller, subj: RE - Other - My Research Question Is Not Listed, Sep. 22, 2005, 11:06 a.m. (In author’s files).

22. Msg, AFOPO/AFCCS to LeMay and Clay, W-84775, 272342Z Jun 1948, in Folder “Cables—General Clay—June 1948,” Box 12, Lucius Clay Papers, Stack 130/7645/6 to 7546/1, National Archives and Records Administration. “Tare” is the seed of a “vetch,” any of a genus of herbaceous, twining, leguminous plants. Alternately, it is a deduction from the gross weight of a substance and its container to allow for the weight of the container, or it can be an empty vessel used to counterpoise the change in weight of the container caused by factors such as temperature or moisture. Interestingly, the June 27 message also used “KING” for “k” and “UNCLE” for “u,” thus the U.K. appeared as UNCLE KING and the U.S. as UNCLE SUGAR.


24. Miller, To Save a City, pp. 152, 186.

The 2001 intervention in Afghanistan and 2003 intervention in Iraq have given rise to a continuing debate over exit strategies and the meaning of victory. Fortunately, there is no dearth of recent solid scholarship to help us conceptualize and understand the contemporary and historical determinants of defeat and victory, notably: Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, 2004; Ivan Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, 2005, and Robert Mandel, The Meaning of Military Victory, 2006. This book is no exception. Divided into two parts and eleven chapters (each by different authors), it first explores the nature of victory and defeat in modern war—and the usefulness of these concepts in describing the outcomes of war; and, secondly, explains victory and defeat in war.

Angstrom opens by noting that, contrary to the bulk of the literature on the subject, this book pays particular attention to victory and defeat in the context of small wars, insurgencies, and terrorism. Victory and defeat in the latter contexts do not necessarily equal war termination. The outcomes of war are thus important to study not only because of their long-lasting influence over decision makers, but also because a better understanding of their nature could lead to more effective use of force and interventions.

Robert Mandel argues that the meaning of victory has changed across time, circumstance, culture, and agents, and analyzes two approaches to the notion of victory. The first approach considers that victory occurs if the outcome of war is aligned with the victor’s predetermined objective end state prior to its entering into warfare. The second approach considers that victory can be declared if the cost-benefit ratio is positive in the judgment of the victor. Both approaches, of course, are not immune from perceptual bias and manipulation. Mandel thus argues that victory is an inherently subjective concept and not always as clear as one would like to expect. He suggests that it be split into two distinct time phases: the first (war winning) coinciding with the end of military clashes; and the second (peace winning) with the establishing of postwar stability once informational, political, economic, social, and diplomatic objectives have been attained, which can be called strategic victory.

Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney then illustrate Mandel’s argument by looking at the “1975 Mayaguez Incident (a failure perceived as a success) and the 1992-1994 U.S. intervention in Somalia (a success perceived as a failure).” To explain perceptions of victory in each case, they use two frameworks: score-keeping (judgments on the cost-benefit ratio), and match-fixing (interpretations of events subject to psychological and informational biases). They argue that both incidents represent cases of match-fixing, with score-keeping being the preferable option to determine victory and defeat.

The counter-insurgency in Iraq is assessed by Ian Beckett. He says insurgenccies are political problems related to legitimacy, which primarily necessitate a political response allied to a sense of security promoting good governance. This sense of security, he argues, is missing in Iraq, whose prospects he believes are not good.

Angstrom explores how the U.S. understands victory in the war on terrorism by examining its criteria for success, including casualty figures, control of territory, the frequency of terrorist acts, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and the spread of democracy. He concludes that several of the U.S. criteria represent a military understanding of victory making it difficult to determine whether or not the U.S. is winning the war against terrorism. But he acknowledges that the U.S. is also using, although to a lesser extent, political criteria to define victory. This configuration of criteria for victory, however, has not been conducive to the pursuit of a coherent strategy.

Writing on paradoxes of the strategy of terrorism, Duyvesteyn notes that it is far from clear what deters terrorists. As a result, strategies of provocation, retaliation, and deterrence may be counter-productive. Notwithstanding this important conclusion, the predominant approaches used against terrorists—the military and judicial options—are still privileged in the absence of very tangible results, and an evaluation of their effects over time. This is the first paradox. The other options (political and psychological and socio-economic), however, have not been more successful at lessening terrorism. This is the second paradox. She therefore recommends a research agenda that would focus on the interaction between terrorism and counter-terrorism.

Ivan Arreguín-Toft compares past cases of victories and defeats of states against terrorists and insurgents (the British in Malaya; the Soviets in Afghanistan). Counterterrorism should not be about winning through the use of violence first, but instead through recognition of the grievances that may be legitimate. A counterrorism strategy should avoid indiscriminate use of violence, a necessary but insufficient condition of victory which should be “accompanied by meaningful economic and political reforms aimed at addressing the insurgency’s legitimate grievances.”

Gil Meroff offers answers to the question of why Western democracies have so many difficulties winning against asymmetric opponents. He classifies the reasons into three categories. The first posits that “power is the ultimate arbiter in conflict”; the second that motivation, will, and interest are determining factors; and the third that command and battlefield performance are the difference makers. He supplements these reasons with two obstacles to winning: “inability to tolerate one’s own cost, particularly casualties, and inability to tolerate excessive brutality towards the other.” He warns that Western states should avoid engaging in asymmetric conflicts unless they have a clear exit strategy.

Stephen Biddle assesses factors that led to (military) victory in Afghanistan. He argues that close combat was as important as standoff precision, and that the Afghan theater was characterized by both continuities and novelties. The Taliban learned to adapt their cover and concealment to overwhelming U.S. firepower and reconnaissance assets and, in so doing, reduced U.S. opportunities for precision attack and increased the necessity for close engagement. In other words, “both precision firepower and skilled ground maneuver” were necessary, but “neither alone was sufficient.” He concludes that Afghanistan has shown that “continuity in the nature of war is at least as important as change.”

Kersti Larsdotter argues that the culture of the intervening forces may have an impact on the outcome of military interventions because culture can influence perceptions and behavior. Culture, however, changes over time; and it may not be the “only influence on the outcome of military interventions and war,” as “other factors may be more significant.”

Duyvesteyn concludes by noting that the preceding chapters seem to strongly suggest that winning is more about politics and psychology than technology and military might, and that how one conceives of victory influences the conduct of war. In the absence of decisive battles, victory, however, will remain difficult to measure, although it cannot be achieved in the absence of a clear and feasible strategy. That strategy should be wary of the conditions for exit, “because showing the opponent your maximum commitment to a war undermines your chances of success.”

As the foregoing illustrates, the
nature of winning and losing, and how one does so, are very salient and important topics in light of what is going on in Iraq and Afghanistan today. While some of the conclusions reached by several of the authors may appear commonsensical and intuitive, they are reached on the basis of solid scholarship. This book is a good addition to the literature and should serve as a starting point to move this field of research forward.

Mr. Stéphane Lefebvre is Section Head, Strategic Analysis, at the Centre for Operational Research and Analysis, Defence Research & Development Canada.

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Do you know the names von Richthofen, Fonck, and Rickenbacker? History fans may know the names of the leading German, French and American aces of World War I, how many kills they had, or which was the leading ace. But how many other aces flew in the war? How many great stories remain untold about other men brave enough to fly and fight in those early days of aviation?

Those pilots had to be incredibly brave in the early years of aviation. Pilots had very short life spans because aviation was so dangerous. Fonck’s first aerial victory in August 1916, was less than 13 years after the first Wright Brothers flight in December 1903, and less than eight years after the first Wright Brothers flight in December 1903. The Air Service then assigned Kindley to command a squadron at Kelly Field in San Antonio. It was there that he crashed again, on February 1, 1920, and died immediately when his aircraft struck the ground.

From flight training and ferrying aircraft to combat and air races, Capt. Field Kindley was one of the great young martyrs of aviation. He bravely took to the skies again and again in aviation’s dangerous early years. His story is one of the many tales of these pioneers of the sky. Those interested in aviation history, military history or World War I will enjoy this book.

**Maj. Herman Reinhold, USAF (Ret.), Athens, N.Y.**


Tony Blackman explains his book as “about what we did to make the Vulcan work, what we did to sort out all the problems and how we managed to make it a safe and also delightful aircraft to fly.” He spent many years flying Vulcans, first in a flight test role as a member of the Royal Air Force (RAF), and subsequently doing developmental and flight test work for the Vulcan’s manufacturer, Avro. He personally flew 105 of the 136 Vulcans that came off the production line and is eminently qualified to describe the flight testing of this aircraft.

Many of us probably have scant knowledge of the British V-bombers: Victor, Valiant, Handley-Page Victor, and Avro Vulcan. These aircraft were contemporaries of the USAF B-47 and B-52, and they carried their share of NATO’s deterrent mission during the 1950s and into the 1960s. The Vulcan was originally conceived in 1947, and the first flight of a production model was in 1955. The final production model of this delta-winged nuclear bomber had a crew of five and a maximum gross takeoff weight of 204,000 pounds. Of the three V-bomber designs, the Vulcan was the most successful, lasting until the 1980s. Its swan song came with the UK’s Falkland’s War with Argentina in 1982.

The book is technically oriented, describing in considerable detail the problems associated with the development and testing of this large delta winged bomber. For example, Blackman tells the story of one of the worst of the early problems: the Vulcan was longitudinally unstable at speeds above .88 indicated Mach number. He describes flight testing the fix, a Mach trimmer that would automatically make the control inputs at high Mach numbers feel natural to the pilot. The aircraft was still extremely unstable, and the full authority of the Mach trimmer’s ability to control the elevators was reached at about 1.0 indicated Mach number. The upper speed of the aircraft was eventually limited to .98 indicated Mach. Blackman’s role at this time as a test pilot at Boscombe Downs was evaluating the acceptability of various modifications for the RAF.

Blackman includes a useful glossary; timeline; and several appendices that include accident reports, flight test reports, a production history, a table of configuration differences for subsequent aircraft as production progressed, RAF squadrons that operated the Vulcans, and a table of specifications.

This is not a book for the general reader, although the author attempts to couch the story of the development of the Vulcan in the context of the Cold War. It is a book that will appeal to those associated with the flight-test business. Many of my old friends from Edwards AFB will no doubt enjoy reading about the technical problems encountered in the Vulcan’s development and their solutions.

**Col. Stetson M. Siler, Colonel, USAF (Ret.)**


Walter Boyne has produced another novel concerning the romance of aircraft,
the flying business, and those individuals who participate in the aviation industry. He is a proven authority on the general topic of aviation and the specific topic of flying. Boyne is a retired Air Force colonel with 5,000 flight hours and is the former Director of the National Air and Space Museum—two experiences which give him the needed credibility to write a book worthy of a reader's time. Adding to this technical aviation experience is his proven ability to write. Boyne is a prolific author with 500 articles and 30 books (fiction and nonfiction) which adds to the reasons why this book is worth the price. It directly follows an earlier fiction work, Dawn over Kitty Hawk, which addresses the dawn of manned flight. Supersonic Thunder then thrusts the reader into the dawn of jet flight through the lens of the fictional Shannon family whose members participate in all elements of American flight experience: aircraft design, company management, and jet flying.

Supersonic Thunder covers the water-front of the dawn of the jet age. It offers a rather broad and fast-paced story of the early development of jet aircraft into American military and commercial aviation. Additionally, it speaks of the beginning of manned space flight as well as the application of jet airpower in Vietnam.

I was captured by three areas in this work. The first was the vehicle of using a fictional American family that was employed in the aviation industry. Through the lens of their experiences, the subsequent development of the aviation industry became self-evident. Of course, this was not an average American family but one that had the necessary technical skills to become part of the fabric of the emerging industry and to attain leadership roles in America's newest aviation firms. The second lens used in the book is the approach in describing the public policy discussion of how a fast developing and technologically based industry actually grew into the American culture. This lens speaks directly to technological development and the growth of this capability in various aviation companies. Also described, to a lesser degree, is the relationship of the government and this fledgling industry and the means to keep alive certain companies via government contract awards (e.g., whether all government contracts should go to the big companies—an action which may limit future growth of the overall aircraft industry). The third theme occurs during the ending chapters of the book and tells the tale of a Korean War F-86 pilot who volunteers to go back into the Air Force to fly the F-4 in Vietnam. He is shot down and held captive by the North Vietnamese. Boyne relates the harshness of POW existence and the various emotional bonds that existed both in the prison and on the home front.

I recommend this book to the arm-chair aviation buff for its offering of the waterfront of jet aviation activity. I also recommend it to experienced aircraft enthusiasts for the insights offered from this talented aviation author and knowledgeable historian of this genre of American experience.

Col. Joe McCue, USAF (Ret.), Springfield, Virginia


Caldwell and Muller are both reputable aviation historians who have produced a number of historical works, primarily on World War Two aviation. Their specialty area has been on the German Luftwaffe. Caldwell has written extensively on JG 26, the Jagdgeschwader (fighter wing) known as "Schlageter," the unit accepted as the "top guns" of the Luftwaffe. Muller has not only produced numerous works on World War Two aviation history but also serves on the faculty of the U.S. Air Force's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

The authors have done a great amount of research that includes not only official records but also interviews. They interviewed many surviving Americans and Germans; their efforts went a long way towards adding a poignant narrative touch to what might otherwise have been a fairly dry technical account of daily missions. Correlating the experiences of the American bomber pilots with the experiences of the German fighter pilots using interviews and diary entries gives this book a voice not often heard in books about forces fighting each other who speak different languages. Not the case here, since the authors have overcome the language barrier to offer the reader an idea of what warriors on both sides were thinking and experiencing during their harrowing escapades over the skies of Europe.

Luftwaffe over Germany is arranged chronologically beginning with a short treatment of air defense in the period from World War One up to the beginnings of World War Two. The book then moves into German efforts to repel British bombing efforts, the American entry into the air war, and runs through the final days of the lost cause to defend the German skies. Details on fighter development, administrative reorganization, and experimental technology efforts are interspersed with accounts of the various air battles.

The scope of the book lies in virtually exclusive coverage of the daytime air defense; the only mention of the night defense resides in how night fighter units assisted in daytime defense efforts. The book fits in well with existing World War Two aviation literature, especially since it is based on its unique approach of offering perspectives from both sides. Predicated on the inclusion of participant narrative accounts, a wealth of pictures from both official and private sources, and the care in offering a balanced view of the story—a military history rather than a focus on Nazi politics—this book is readable, informative, and a valuable contribution to the field.

David J. Scheppe, 28th Bomb Wing Historian, Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota


Twenty years ago the Naval Institute Press took a chance publishing Stephen Coonts' first book. Flight of the Intruder took off and started his successful writing career. The novel has been released in a twentieth anniversary edition that is more relevant today than ever.

The book tells the story of a Navy bomber pilot, Jack Grafton, who wonders if he is doing the right thing in Vietnam when he bombs targets in the jungle instead of striking the North Vietnamese directly in Hanoi. This tale has the danger, camaraderie, excitement, comedy, and tragedy of military service and combat, along with the reflection and quest for relaxation between missions. Coonts was a naval aviator and knows the details of flight and life on an aircraft carrier. He communicates the emotions, sights, and sounds of Navy life.

Navy life in the Vietnam War included the universal human feelings of fear, anxiety, love, and hate. But the Vietnam War has a lot in common with America's wars of today in Iraq and Afghanistan. Servicemen may feel the same strong emotions. Both eras had peace protestors and calls for the troops to return home. In both eras, Americans are outsiders who don’t understand the culture and language of the nations where they serve. In both eras,
Americans are dealing with civil wars where U.S. forces can't easily tell which side local people are on. While Grafton wanted to “take the war to the North Vietnamese,” today’s servicemen may wonder if they are doing the right thing in Iraq or Afghanistan, facing dangers on the streets every day instead of destroying the headquarters and neighborhoods of known enemies.

Grafton wondered about the value of his contributions, while today’s American servicemen may wonder about their contributions as they look at the continuing violence of suicide bombers in Afghanistan and Iraq, or the increasing amount of heroin produced in Afghanistan, or the millions of refugees and thousands killed in the civil war in Iraq that started after the invasion. American servicemen may wonder why they never found weapons of war, or if they want to see how the issues of war often more specifically, he wanted to fight the Japanese; and he wanted to do so in the air. Joining the Naval Air Corps would make sure his odds were good at getting back at the Japanese.

This book is Davis’ firsthand account of his wartime military and flying experiences, from the day he volunteered for military service until just after the war ended. Set to a brisk pace, his story is both easily readable and generously speckled with rollicking funny wartime humor that includes a good dose of fighter-pilot antics. Whether its describing how his squadron smuggled crates of liquor onto their aircraft carrier Intrepid right under the nose of the captain, or about flying under the Golden Gate Bridge, Davis gives a good accounting of his experiences in preflight and flight training, flights in the Brewster Buffalo, and combat in the Grumman F6F Hellcat. He also expresses a common sentiment amongst naval flight students at the time: their mounting frustration and impatience as he and his fellow student pilots often wondered if they would ever get to fight. But he also breaks with the training storyline as he relates tall tales of romantic exploits.

Imagine how one must have felt upon hearing the news of the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. For those looking forward to the festivities of the holiday season, it was instead a somber time. For those young men about to graduate from school, it was a time of uncertainty and foreboding. America was now at war. “Bill” Davis was one such young man. A senior engineering student at the University of Pennsylvania, he had just interviewed with Radio Corporation of America (RCA) and been offered a job earning $190 per month. His future was set. But the Japanese attack had been a “shock of unbelievable proportions.” Navy recruiters showed up at the university three days after the attack with offers of immediate service for all engineers. They all signed up—except for Davis.

The flagrant attack on Pearl Harbor had greatly incensed the highly competitive Davis. He took the attack personally. Turning down his once-in-a-lifetime job offer, he also declined joining the Navy to become simply a naval engineer. He had no desire to sit back in some backwater engineering shop designing ships, aircraft, or other weapons of war for others to fight with. Instead, Davis volunteered to fight. More specifically, he wanted to fight the Japanese; and he wanted to do so in the air. Joining the Naval Air Corps would make sure his odds were good at getting back at the Japanese.

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Flying and fighting is the central theme of the book, however, and one appreciates the evident similarities and differences in aviation from back then to the present. His numerous aviation anecdotes include: On landing, stay ten knots above stalling speed, add five more if you’re married, and two more for each child. On the difficulties of “coming aboard” the carrier, one young naval aviator almost experienced the wrath of the air officer: “If he doesn’t land this time, shoot him down.” He made it!

Ultimately Davis did make it to the war and he did get his chance for revenge on the Japanese by scoring a direct hit on the carrier Zuikaku, one of the carriers that attacked Pearl Harbor. In all, this is a great book well worth reading and ends on a reflective note with Davis stating, “I only wish I had done more.” To which I would reply: “So did you far more than was required. And if you don’t mind my saying so, Sinking the Rising Sun is a damned fine account of your wartime experiences. It is not only a fitting tribute to your personal achievements, but also to those of your squadron mates, to those who did not return, and to naval aviation as well. Thank you!”

LCDR Phil Webb, USN, Naval Aviator 24384, Navy Region Southwest Asia, Bahrain


Artem Drabkin does an excellent job of sharing the stories and experiences of a handful of Soviet fighter pilots (all with fewer than 15 individual kills—typical for the VVS) and one aircraft maintenance troop. He searched out and interviewed Soviet Air Force (VVS) veterans from the Great Patriotic War (World War II). This book is a compilation of six of these interviews and is divided into separate chapters for each interview. It is very apparent that Drabkin painstakingly recorded and transcribed the veterans’ experiences, making sure to share their stories in their own words. By always relaying the interviews in an intact format, some points are, of necessity, repeated. However, this helps to press home certain underlying themes or shared experiences throughout the book.

The book contains candid, honest, unedited opinions and memories from the Soviet viewpoint. The interviewees discuss how unprepared the Soviet Air Force was for war. They all share their stories about how they became interested in flying and ended up as fighter pilots. Interestingly, several of the pilots mentioned they were attracted to the uniforms!

Each of the pilots gave his opinion of how Soviet fighters compared to German fighters, his favorite airplane, and the most dangerous German aircraft to try to shoot down. All of them disliked the British Hurricane. Most of them preferred flying a Soviet plane, such as the Yak–1, rather than fly a Lend-Lease aircraft like the P–39 or P–40. They all compared their aircraft honestly and often favorably to their German foes, making sure to point out how to fight with and against each aircraft. Interestingly, at one time or another, all the pilots were shot down. Several were shot down multiple times and to a man
A theme that flows through the book is how alcohol, mainly vodka, was a constant in their day. Only one pilot said that he didn’t drink before or after a sortie and commented that, for him, alcohol and flying didn’t mix. A second theme is the greater Soviet mistrust of their own people. Each squadron had a SMERSH (death to spies, part of the NKVD) representative. “The rule was: if you disengaged without reason, SMERSH would investigate you immediately.” Another pilot relates how he was shot down behind German lines. His face was severely burned, but after ten days he miraculously escaped and got back to Soviet lines. He was subsequently investigated as a traitor and released only because he was a prisoner for just ten days.

The book is filled with interesting stories of Soviet bureaucracy, air combat on the Eastern Front, and personalized insight into the Soviet war experience. The chapters are captivating and gripping, helping to make the book an easy and enjoyable read. Any reader not overly familiar with World War II aircraft should first read Appendix 2 (Soviet Aircraft) and look at the photos of the aircraft.

If you’re looking for an in-depth, comprehensive analysis of the early days of the air war on the Eastern Front, this is not the book for you. However, if you want a personalized view from the seldom seen Soviet viewpoint, this book is an absolute must read.

Lt. Col. Daniel J. Simonsen, USAF, Commander AFROTC Detachment 305, Louisiana Tech University, Ruston, Louisiana


This book, the second volume in the University of Nebraska Press’ “Outward Odyssey: A People’s History of Spaceflight” series, meets that series’ intent. It is clearly written and priced for general rather than academic readers. Unusual for a book from an academic press, In the Shadow of the Moon includes neither notes nor an index, usual staples of scholarly writing. The authors are accomplished popular space writers, not university professors, and have several previous books on space history to their individual and joint credit including the first volume in the series, Into that Silent Sea: Trailblazers of the Space Era, 1961-1965.

This is also a “people’s” history as it focuses almost exclusively on the human dimension of spaceflight. The stories of the Gemini and Apollo programs and their Soviet contemporaries Voshkod and Soyuz are told through the stories of the crewmembers and their experiences before, during, and after each mission. Each new astronaut or cosmonaut (not already profiled in Into that Silent Sea) receives a short biography beginning with his earliest dreams of flying or going into space and continuing through training to his mission(s). The accomplishments and failures of each mission receive thorough coverage in chronological order. There is far more about the politics of NASA’s Astronaut Office and anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, both of which impacted which spacefarers flew, and in what order, than there is about the role of the Space Race in the Cold War or the development of space hardware. It is telling that the book contains twenty five photographs of astronauts and cosmonauts, with politicians and rockets only in the background, if at all visible.

French and Burgess emphasize the importance of the American Gemini program as a crucial stepping-stone to the moon landing, where astronauts developed the critical techniques of orbital rendezvous, docking, and spacewalking, not without serious difficulties and setbacks. The authors highlight the flexibility and adaptability of the astronauts as they faced unexpected difficulties dealing with the unique environment of orbit, especially the challenges of extra-vehicular activities.

The authors skip the background of the Saturn booster and Apollo spacecraft to move to the tragic Apollo 1 fire that killed three astronauts. The story then moves through each of the Apollo missions in sequence, culminating with the Apollo 11 landing on the moon. Exploration of the moon is left, presumably, to the next volume. The landing itself receives fewer pages of coverage than one might expect, but the reader already knows the astronauts, introduced in the chapters on Gemini, and already knows the technical challenges they faced, as they built on the experiences described on previous flights. The Soviet space program was relatively quiescent during these years, but the end of Voshkod and the beginning of Soyuz, with their accompanying tragedies, receive coverage as well. Unmanned satellite programs of any nation receive no mention.

Readers familiar with the era will gain few new insights into the American or Soviet space programs but will find valuable the many illustrative anecdotes gathered through numerous interviews and a thorough combing of previous interviews and publications. Readers new to space history will find a fascinating, well-written, human story but would be well advised to read Into that Silent Sea first.


This book is undoubtedly the definitive study to date on the political activities in the United States, Soviet Union, and Japan surrounding the end of World War II. Professor Hasegawa has employed his fluency in English, Japanese, and Russian to search through myriad documents associated with the vast number of players involved in the final acts of the war. The result is a well-documented and well-analyzed treatment of the political machinations that took place primarily within the three countries. Great Britain and China and their leaders were also involved, but Truman, Stalin, and Hirohito and their respective staffs and advisors are the main players in the drama. And Hasegawa has brilliantly brought their roles into focus.

What the professor well documents is the complexity of the human relationships in any governmental decision-making process. There were many factions in Japan with their own agendas and desires; but it isn’t much prettier to watch the players from the American side. We observe the Departments of War, Navy, and State and the White House interact, outflank, and do whatever necessary to win over the President. Stalin’s regime was a bit easier to control internally, but his interface with Truman and Hirohito’s representatives and the gamesmanship involved are fascinating. The varying political goals, the driving technology of the bombs, agreements reached at Yalta and Potsdam, and differing cultural aspects all play in the drama.

Several warnings must be posted and understood before one tackles this book. First, it reads like War and Peace. One must keep track of a great number of characters, many with Japanese and Russian
names. Second, if the reader is disposed to believing that the atomic bombs were the causal event, the discussion about the end of mankind’s most destructive conflict, you are going to be unhappy with Hasegawa’s conclusions.

As a docent at the Udvar-Hazy Center of the National Air and Space Museum, I have talked with literally thousands of World War II veterans near the nose of the Enola Gay. Almost to a man, their greetings has been “I’m here today because of that plane.” The overwhelming belief is that they were going to die on the shores of Kyushu if the atomic bombings hadn’t brought the Japanese to their knees. While I would never confront one of these aged warriors and tell him I think he’s wrong, during many formal and informal presentations I give about the aircraft and its mission, my position for years has been that four causes brought about the end of the war: (1) the systematic destruction of Japan’s urban and industrial centers by B–29 conventional bombing, (2) the nearly complete isolation of the Home Islands by U.S. submarines and B–29 mining of the ports and major waterways, (3) the atomic bombings only three days apart, and (4) the Soviet invasion of Manchuria and destruction of the Kwantung Army. I could give very little credit to the first of “my” causes. Yet his presentation speaks to their importance. Throughout the history, Hasegawa’s conclusion is that the primary war-ending action was the Soviet invasion.

I found nothing in this book that necessitates my changing of my presentation. In fact, Hasegawa’s superb research provided me with more details to reinforce my beliefs. Would the war have ended if the bombs hadn’t been dropped? Yes. I think there is no doubt about that. Did the atomic attacks help hasten the end? Unquestionably, yes. But Hasegawa’s interpretation downplays the role of the atomic bombings only three days apart, and (4) the Soviet invasion of Manchuria and destruction of the Kwantung Army. The first two were ongoing, long-term activities; while the second two were immediate and shocking. Hasegawa’s conclusion is that the primary war-ending action was the Soviet invasion.

I have only two bones to pick with this excellent piece of work. The first is that there are a number of errors in material with which I am familiar. Hasegawa says the Trinity test on July 16, 1945, went off an hour and a half before 1:30 p.m. Washington time. The bomb exploded in New Mexico at 5:30 a.m., or 7:30 a.m. Washington time. He has Curtis LeMay as Chief of Staff of XXI Bomber Command when he was Chief of Staff of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific and XXI Bomber Command no longer existed. He uses Bock’s Car instead of the correct Bockscar and quotes some “expert” as saying there was no way the Fat Man could be brought back to base in case of an abort. That is wrong. These and similar errors always make me wonder whether there are other more serious errors in the material I’m not familiar with. In this work, however, I’m inclined to believe that his material is generally correctly presented.

The other problem I had with reading the book is his fallback on the modern historian’s tool of labeling someone whose conclusions you disagree with as a “revisionist historian.” He uses this pejorative term—“it seems to have a connotation as low as “child pornographer”—in a number of places. Yet he himself notes that, “Historians are unanimous in the opinion that Byrnes played a decisive role in rejecting Japan’s conditional acceptance of the Potsdam ultimatum.” He then goes on to show why this is not so. Since he takes on every other historian in the world does that make Hasegawa the perfect revisionist? An historian of his obvious excellence doesn’t need to use such terms, since the role of the historian—in my view—is to revise history in light of new evidence.

Yes, Hasegawa is a revisionist and rightly so. He has put together a compelling work relates leadership lessons from OIF ramp-up through the battles for An Najaf and Al Hillah and his battalion’s later occupation duties.

Hughes presents valuable eyewitness accounts of the early phase of OIF through June 2003, from himself, other officers, senior non-commissioned officers, and embedded media. Beginning with the SCUD threat, field living problems, and the confusion caused by the deadly attack of an American Muslim sergeant on the brigade headquarters, Hughes’ battalion goes on to gain global recognition for its careful mix of lethality and cross-cultural diplomacy. One of the most widely recognized incidents came when Hughes shrewdly handled a mob situation fueled by Ba’athists near the Golden Mosque. He ordered his battalion to kneel and ground weapons. When an interpreter further infuriated the crowd, he ordered the unit to withdraw with weapons remaining pointed down with an order to smile! Many credited Hughes’ fast thinking and the battalion’s discipline to a warming of relations and several future successes.

Hughes’ writing is thoughtful while also being purposeful and direct. He provides many valuable lessons in effective leadership, combat innovation, and “post hostility” operations. Taken in this vein, it provides valuable insights for those with an interest in the military. Air power advocates will also gain some insight into an infantry commander’s concept of supporting fires that includes numerous references to close air support efforts. However, this should not be confused with advocacy for the Air Force. Rather, as the Pentagon lead for integrating counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) efforts, Hughes’ advocacy for tactical air gives way to disdain for service politics when he singles out Air Force Secretary Roche as the cause of many IED deaths, given his budget policies.

Col. Scott A. Willey, USAF (Ret.), NASM Docent and Volunteer


This engaging contemporaneous history takes the reader from preparing an infantry battalion through the early battles of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Hughes continues the story through his follow-on assignments to the Pentagon and National War College (NWC). The last chapters include a mixed bag of personal thoughts and theories concerning the “Global War on Terror.” However, as commander of the 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, Hughes’ most compelling work relates leadership lessons from OIF ramp-up through the battles for An Najaf and Al Hillah and his battalion’s later occupation duties.
Though not as compelling as his battlefield accounts, Hughes’ recollection of Rumsfeld’s Pentagon, Army transformation efforts under General Casey, and Hughes’ own role in unifying a multitude of counter-IED efforts proves insightful. He maintains some connection to OIF in this section, but this begins to unravel as he moves to the NWC. The main connection here comes in his part in the revolt of NWC students to write about their OIF experience rather than old thinkers and battles.

The final section of this book involves Hughes’ analysis of the “Global War on Terror.” Here he gives some very valuable insights as well as some questionable analysis. Though his personal experience is valuable, his “science” uses theories like Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs that has not been empirically validated in our own country, let alone others. However, his underlying theme of greater engagement proves sound. Essentially, he argues that we need to engage a number of groups in meaningful ways to include tribal leaders, media outlets, former Ba’athists, and others to gain a better outcome even if we don’t always agree.

Col. Brett Morris, USAF, Ph.D., Professor of International and National Security Studies, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama


For those interested in the question of why countries in the Mideast and South Asia just can’t seem to get along, this book not only discusses the problem but also offers a solution: “Track Two” Diplomacy. Kaye defines this as any “ unofficial activity that involves professional contacts among elites from adversarial groups with the purpose of addressing policy problems in efforts to analyze, prevent, manage, and ultimately resolve” conflicts. She then evaluates how such efforts can help in socializing participating elites, filtering this socialization into their respective countries, and then spurring policy changes that help resolve conflicts. In the process, she offers an assessment of how effectively these have been done in the regions cited.

This book has a clear policy-making focus. Policy makers, regional specialists, and academics are the primary targets of this work though it does provide some useful insights for military officers and others. Like most RAND texts, it summarizes the work in the first 30 pages. For most readers, the summary would probably be sufficient, as it very successfully captures the essentials of the text.

The author makes no pretense of this text being exhaustive and acknowledges that the nature of these regions vary dramatically thus meriting caution when extrapolating lessons. Nevertheless, she argues that each region has commonalities that might help in transferring successful Track Two initiatives between the two. These include “competitive and dangerous security environments” complete with terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Further, both regions exhibit some cultural barriers to confidence-building measures used successfully elsewhere. Finally, each region has a dominant power that resists international efforts to foster collective security: Israel and India respectively.

Kaye finds varying degrees of success in bringing about change through Track Two Diplomacy in these regions. The most obvious successes come through socialization. Wherever parties have developed a dialogue, greater understanding of actions and language has often followed. She cites both Israel/Egypt and India/Pakistan initiatives as examples. The filtering of such information to the respective nations has been less successful. Because unofficial parties often lack the clout or connectivity with ruling elites, it takes time for information to filter to them—if it flows at all. Because of this, Kaye finds the transmission of this information to any policy making process to be infrequent at best. Thus, direct links between Track Two Diplomacy and policy change are few.

Regionally, Kaye finds a greater degree of success for Track Two Diplomacy in South Asia because of a stronger culture of democracy, stronger cultural ties between adversaries, less domestic opposition, greater formal and informal cooperation, and the presence of publicly declared nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons generate a greater sense of urgency and need, while the other factors help bring about greater cooperation and understanding. Of course, the Indian-Pakistani nuclear standoff serves as the primary source of this discussion. Kaye concludes that without some overarching threat in the Middle East, Track Two Diplomacy may prove useful but will not prove broadly successful.

In the end, Kaye argues that Track Two Diplomacy deserves more emphasis because of its low-cost promise of increased understanding that may help bring about success. Towards this end, she recommends a greater variety of participants to increase the likelihood of information filtering back to key leaders. Among the groups most needed to join these endeavors, she says, are entrepreneurs and military members. (I read this book while performing just such a function in Kazakhstan and was impressed at how accurate many of her insights proved to be). She also recommends increased institutional support for such endeavors. However, it needs to be indirect support and encouragement rather than overtly controlled efforts that would taint them. Finally, she recommends beginning with more localized issues as a way to increase relevance, legitimacy, reach, and ultimately success.

This book provides some valuable conceptual underpinnings as well as specific case studies that might prove useful to many. Though its orientation is one of international policy, its concepts could easily be extrapolated to domestic, and even interpersonal, conflicts. Though it readily acknowledges the need for much more work, it certainly helps answer some key questions about conflict resolution.

Col. Brett Morris, USAF, Ph.D., Professor of International and National Security Studies, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama


In the thirty years since this was first published, there has been a plethora, even a surfeit, of material written about the Vietnam War. Archives have been opened and classified documents revealed. There have been new approaches and interpretations. Writings started with the orthodox school, then the revisionist and neo-revisionist, followed by a re-examination of earlier methods. Despite all of the material that has followed, this book remains a classic. First, it gives an excellent account of that conflict—the factual and largely non-controversial background. Second, it provides opinions and evaluations by a select and highly qualified group at a particular point in history. Thus, these remain valid despite the passage of time—which may have modified ideas and memories.

This work reports and analyzes the
views and attitudes of two-thirds of the U.S. Army generals who were commanders in Vietnam between 1965 and 1973. Kinnard was one of these and, thus, had credibility. He’d had mud on his boots in three wars and wasn’t an egg-head academic. He sent a questionnaire to all of these combat leaders. The comments added to their answers to the questions showed a degree of trust and confidence in his understanding. There were 48 multiple-choice queries broken down into ten subject groups. Polls, surveys, and questionnaires have to be treated with caution—as evidenced by those in use during the current election period. However, this one seems to have been well designed, without evident bias or skewing to elicit desired results. The sample group is outstanding for the purpose, and the extraordinary percentage of returns shows a belief in the seriousness of the project and a desire to contribute.

This is the best concise, objective account of the Vietnam War I have read recently and contains a twist that piques the imagination and maintains interest. It rivals Colonel Harry Summers’ 1981 superb On Strategy which also took a different approach. The book is better for having a map to show the places named in the text.

For those who didn’t read Kinnard when the book first came out, I recommend it now. It even bears re-reading after thirty years.

Brig. Gen. Curtis Hooper O’Sullivan, ANG (Ret.), Salida, California


Based in part on her own experiences as a Coast Guard officer, LaGuardia-Kotite offers a tightly written narrative about the 1985 creation and subsequent utilization of the U.S. Coast Guard rescue swimmers program. Using a series of catastrophic events, she shows the historical basis of the need for the skill set.

But nothing happens simply in the military, and Herculean efforts were necessary to work through the inevitable drag of service bureaucracy to first conceptualize and then define a specific career field for rescue swimmers. The planners looked at the Air Force pararescue jumper (PJ) program but decided that it was too expensive and included far too much medical and combat training for their needs. They ultimately used the Navy model which was developed to train their rescue swimmers—with one significant difference—what the Navy treated as an additional duty, The Coast Guard decided to make it a career field for enlisted men and women. They wanted volunteers who would become key team members with the helicopter crews to provide the ability to rescue those in peril at sea.

When that was accomplished, intrepid young men and women had to be recruited, trained and then posted to units. The training was not easy, and many failed. But the ones who achieved the rating proved the value of the effort as displayed in a series of well told vignettes.

One of the first was for a father and son aboard a 26-foot fishing trawler off the coast of Alaska on a dark and dangerous night in December 1987. When their craft was damaged and then began taking on water in heavy seas and snow showers, the owner sent a distress signal. A Coast Guard HH–3F with a rescue swimmer onboard, Aviation Survivalman Jeff Tunks, launched from Air Station Kiska. Arriving over the boat, they were not able to hoist up the two survivors because of the air turbulence, waves, and damaged rigging on the boat. The two were instructed to go into the water. They had to don exposure suits and did so. Almost immediately, they were numbed by the frigid water and incapable of helping themselves. Tunks was lowered into the water. Fighting the raging wind and towering waves, he was able to reach the two survivors. Above, the helicopter crew fought the raging storm to position the aircraft above the men so they could be brought up. But the turbulence was too severe, and after five tries, they could not do it. Now low on fuel, the crew made one more determined try. This time, they were able to stabilize long enough so that Tunks was able to get the father and son into the rescue basket. When the two were safely aboard, the basket was lowered again for the rescue swimmer. Tunks scrambled into it. However, as he was being hoisted, the helicopter was again slammed with severe wind gusts and almost driven into the water. At the same time, Tunks almost drowned while being dragged through wave after wave. But he made it aboard and all were saved. It was a dramatic example of what the rescue swimmers could accomplish.

Several more intense and harrowing rescues are detailed in the book. All are compelling vignettes, and the reader can see the wisdom of creating such a program.

Overall, the book is a fine effort. It is a fast paced tale and makes for excellent reading for anybody interested in search and rescue operations.

Col. Darrel Whitcomb, USAFR (Ret.), author of The Rescue of Bat 21 and Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm


The Deep Space Network (DSN) is the global system developed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) under contract to NASA to provide communications with interplanetary spacecraft. Douglas Mudgway emigrated from Australia to the United States to work for JPL in the early 1960s and became one of the key DSN designers for the next four decades. Uplink-Downlink (terms referring to the command link from Earth to spacecraft and the telemetry link from spacecraft back to Earth, respectively) captures in great detail the evolution of this system during its first 40 years. This book is not a history in the conventional sense of presenting an analysis of people, places, events, and impacts of this key part of the U.S. space program. It is instead engineering archaeology, describing the architecture and design of the constituent components and subsystems of the DSN as they changed over time to meet the exponentially increasing demands of spacecraft as they went deeper and deeper into the solar system and sent back growing amounts of data.

The book’s chapters are based on the flagship missions that drove major improvements in DSN performance: Genesis (1957-61) covering the initial lunar probes, the Mariner era (1961-74), the Viking era (1974-1978), the Voyager era (1978-1986), the Galileo era (1986-96), and the Cassini era (1996-97+). Each chapter covers key technical characteristics of the missions that drove DSN performance and operation of the network with an overview of network design suitable for non-engineers. The chapters then dive into network engineering at a level of detail that would interest—and be comprehensible to—a communication engineer. Additional chapters delve into the

In the Fall 2007 issue of Air Power History, I reviewed Part Three (the first part published) of Captain O’Connell’s trilogy. At the time, I felt he had written an exceptional piece of history. Parts One and Two have done nothing to diminish that evaluation.

These two volumes continue in the same style as the first. They provide an overall history of whatever conflict is under discussion so that the reader understands the context in which airpower was employed. O’Connell well lays out the types and numbers of craft used by the various air power forces and—perhaps even more importantly—overlays them on the doctrines and policies under which they had to operate. One of the recurrent doctrinal themes running throughout Part Two, in particular, is employment of strategic versus tactical air power. This will get the juices flowing in many readers who may not like what O’Connell says, but that’s the purpose of books such as these, in my opinion.

Part One begins the story of air power. It is divided into three parts: World War I, the development of air power theories and air forces between the wars, and applications of air power between the wars. Coverage of the First World War is short—but so was the overall contribution of air power to the outcome of that war. The second part is considerably longer since it was during the post-War I years that Trenchard, Mitchell, Douhet, and others formulated much of the theory that was put into use early in mankind’s greatest struggle. Here O’Connell examines air power theory developed by each of the major contestants of the next big war: The third part looks at the use of air power in many of the smaller conflicts that took place up to 1939. Some readers may not even be familiar with some of the events (e.g., Polish-Soviet War, Rif War, some of the UK’s small air-control wars in west Asia, and the Gran Chaco War), fewer know that air power played any role.

The second volume deals exclusively with World War II. Following on the first volume, O’Connell discusses each of the major participating countries in separate chapters. He begins each country’s coverage with its air power doctrines and concepts and then looks at how well—or poorly—its air power forces performed their intended roles using major battles and campaigns as examples. The United States is covered last and is divided into subchapters on the Army Air Forces, Navy, and Marine Corps. There is some redundancy here, as it is difficult to talk about Marine Air and Naval Air separately, but it does not detract from the message.

While hundreds of books have been written on the use of air power during the Second World War, I don’t think there is a better, more compact overall analysis of the forces employed and the results of the use of those forces anywhere.

I had only two problems with these books. Unless one is really familiar with most of the world, the reader is going to have to have an atlas at hand in order to picture the territory being addressed. There are no maps. Also, particularly in Part Two, I perceived a slight bias against U.S. Army aviation, particularly strategic, and a little rosier picture of naval aviation during World War II. In all fairness, this might be my own Air Force background showing through. O’Connell and I evidently have slightly different perceptions of the effectiveness of air power during that war. But I think it is obvious that the debate about strategic bombing will go on as long as people discuss air power. O’Connell has well expressed his interpretations; they are thought provoking and provide an excellent context in which to further the study of this area of history.

In summary, these two volumes combined with the earlier part of the trilogy are the finest look at air power’s first 90 years that I have read—or expect to read anytime soon. One may not agree with everything said, but I don’t think readers will find a better structured look at how countries have used aircraft in war and how those forces contributed to overall national goals. If there is a tour de force of air power history, this trilogy is it.

Col. Scott A. Willey, USAF (Ret.), NASM Docent and Volunteer


Bien que ce livre est en français c’est un bon livre pour n’importe qui aime le P-47 coup de foudre. [Translation: Even though this book is in French, it is a book for anyone who likes the P-47 Thunderbolt.] From 1944 until 1960, the French Air Force flew between 550 and 600 (some sources give a figure of 446) P-47s of various models. The Republic P-47, with over 13,000 built, was one of the United States’
main fighters during World War II. Known for its durability, the P–47 was an outstanding close air support aircraft as well as an excellent escort fighter. P–47 Thunderbolt discusses the French Air Force’s acquisition of the P–47 as well as early combat against surrounded German positions bypassed during the Normandy breakout. After World War II, the P–47s remained in service in the French Air Force to include participation in the French-Algerian War. The book does an outstanding job of giving details about each Group that flew the Thunderbolt. The group histories are very detailed focusing on activation dates, aircraft models, locations, dates, and brief descriptions of combat action. The group descriptions focus on details rather than “there I was” stories. Along with each group description is high-quality color artwork of the various group patches. While primarily focusing on the later “bubble canopy” models, there is some photographic coverage of the earlier “razorback” models.

The strengths of this book are the photographs and drawings. Even though the book is only 64 pages, there are 150 high-quality black-and-white and 16 color photographs along with 24 detailed aircraft profiles in color. While there are air-to-air photographs, a majority of the photos are static shots taken on the ramp. All of the photographs and profiles are accompanied with very detailed captions, including (when available) detailed model numbers, tail numbers, unit, date, and location.

While written in French, the book is easily translated to English either via any online translation website or with a basic knowledge of French from a high school French class. While the book focuses on details, these are not excessive to the point of making the book boring. P–47 Thunderbolt Francais is the only book dedicated to the French Air Force’s P–47 operations. It is an excellent photographic reference for aircraft modelers. For the P–47 fan, P–47 Thunderbolt Francais is worth adding to your collection; it’s a solid book with no counterpart on the literary market.

Lt. Col. Daniel J. Simonsen, USAF, Commander AFROTC Detachment 305, Louisiana Tech University, Ruston, Louisiana


Ap Bac is in many ways an obscure, short-duration, and relatively small-scale engagement in a war far away and 45 years ago. It was a clash early in the Vietnam War during the advisory phase, between battalion-sized elements of the Viet Cong insurgents and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). U.S. Army involvement consisted of a handful of advisors and helicopters. So why are we revisiting this minor battle?

For students of the Vietnam War and of presidential decision-making process in that phase of the war, the Battle of Ap Bac was a watershed event. Before the battle, the United States was in the relatively low-key and very limited advisor phase of the war. Because of misinterpretations of the war in general and of what the battle signified, the United States in its aftermath made a series of fateful decisions that led by 1965 to full-blown, direct involvement in major combat in Vietnam. This book steps the reader through events and decision-making surrounding the battle and the conclusions drawn not only at the tactical level, but also—and much more importantly—in Washington at both the White House and at the Pentagon. As Toczek makes abundantly clear, “they did everything but learn from it.” The author argues that it should have been obvious to senior military leadership and the Kennedy Administration that U.S. policy was headed in the wrong direction. Generals and administration advisors were misleadingly placing a luster on events that were unconnected to the reality on the ground. Worst of all, the Administration was investing American lives in a war that was not properly understood and was poorly managed.

The value of history, much more than its record of the past, is found in its universal lessons. The lessons of this book consequently have a universal value. Although Toczek, a history professor at West Point, wrote this book prior to the current war in Iraq, its reissue during the fifth year of combat in that theater must have been done with Iraq’s parallels to the Vietnam War in mind. It practically begs to be contrasted with presidential decision making and the judgments made by senior military leadership in the current war. Reading this book makes one painfully aware of the similarities found in the two wars. The misreading of the insurgency in Vietnam and then in Iraq led to poorly arrived at decisions in both conflicts resulting in near catastrophic consequences; and dissenters in both conflicts were rewarded for their clarity of thought by being marginalized.

This is a short book that reads easily. It is worth the small investment in time to explore the universal lessons captured by the author, even if the reader is not a Vietnam War aficionado.

Col. John L. Cirafici, USAF (Ret.), Milford, Delaware

Hells Hawks!: The Untold Story of the American Fliers Who Savaged Hitler's Wehrmacht

by Robert F. Dorr & Thomas D. Jones

Zenith Press:
Due out June 15, 2008
$24.95

New publication by our Technical Editor
Books Received


Prospective Reviewers

Anyone who believes he or she is qualified to substantively assess one of the new books listed above is invited to apply for a gratis copy of the book. The prospective reviewer should contact:

Col. Scott A. Willey, USAF (Ret.)
3704 Brices Ford Ct.
Fairfax, VA 22033
Tel. (703) 620-4139
e-mail: scottwille@aol.com

* Already under review.
In 1943 the U.S. Army Air Forces created what would become the Air Commandos, a unit that marked a milestone in tactical operations in support of British ground forces invading Burma. William T. Y’Blood tells the story of how these daring American aviators trained and went into combat using unconventional hit-and-run tactics to confuse the enemy and destroy their lines of communication and supply. The force comprised light planes to evacuate wounded, transports to move heavy cargo, fighters, bombers, gliders, helicopters, and more than five hundred men. The book describes how this top secret force successfully attacked the enemy from the air, resupplied British commandos on the ground, and airlifted the wounded out of the battle area—eventually driving the Japanese out of Burma.

William T. Y’Blood, a pilot in the U.S. Air Force and later in commercial aviation, served as a historian for the Air Force. The author of eight books on World War II aviation topics, he died in 2006, just after completing this book.

Available at fine bookstores and on-line at www.nip.org/store/
The President’s Message

Reserve the Date – Monday, October 6, 2008

We’ve been very busy on a number of fronts lately – nominating a new class for the Board, helping prepare a new book on World War II, selecting book and article award winners, choosing our Spaatz and Holley Award recipients for this year, upgrading our website, even doing some extensive housecleaning at our office at Andrews AFB. But what I most want you to know about is the special event we’re planning for this October. Here’s the scoop:

The Foundation’s annual Awards Banquet will be held on Monday, October 6th, at the Sheraton Crystal City Hotel. We’ll be honored to have Gen. Ron Fogleman, USAF (Ret.), former Chief of Staff and a member of the Foundation’s Board of Directors, as our after dinner speaker. On that occasion
we will also present our Gen. Carl A. “Tooey” Spaatz Award for history-making to **Maj. Gen. John Alison**, USAF (Ret.), whose long service to the Air Force included being a member of the Flying Tigers, the Air Commandos, and much, much more. And we’ll present our Prof. I. B. Holley Award for history writing and teaching to **Brig. Gen. Al Hurley**, USAF (Ret.), a historian of passionate commitment to advancing the appreciation and understanding of military and Air Force history. Our annual awards for best book and best article will also be presented that evening.

And that’s not all. In an unusual initiative, **Lt Gen Dave Deptula**, DCS for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, will lead an informal session from 1630 to 1800 on current Air Force issues. Sitting in one of the hottest seats in the Air Staff, General Deptula is uniquely able to inform and to answer questions. [There’s no added cost for this session.]

But wait! There’s more. That afternoon, at 1400, also in the Sheraton, we will hold our annual meeting open to members. This will be in conjunction with a semi-annual Board meeting. So, I encourage everyone to come out to see what we’re up to – and, if so moved, to give us your input.

You can register for all these events – and learn more about them – on our website, or you can call our office at 301-736-1959. You can also see more about the banquet on p. 70 in this magazine.

Some of you will remember the highly successful two-day symposium we held last October in the same hotel. Our plan is to have another symposium next year and in all odd numbered years. For you writers of Air Force history, you can be looking for a call for papers for next year’s event coming soon.

By the way, if you are a member of the Foundation, you should have received a mailing recently soliciting your vote on several changes to the bylaws and on the nominations of six Board members for the class of 2008-2011. If that ballot is still in your in-box, I urge you to get it out and give us your vote.

Hope you can be with us for the awards bash in October.

Cheers to all, Mike Nelson

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Lt. Gen. Michael A. Nelson, USAF (Ret.)
President
Air Force Historical Foundation
The Air Force Historical Foundation proudly announces its 2008 annual awards banquet will be held on Monday, October 6, 2008, at the Sheraton Crystal City Hotel, 1800 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, Virginia. Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, is the featured guest speaker. The Foundation will present four prestigious awards during the banquet, including:

The second annual **General Carl A. “Tooey” Spaatz Award** for sustained, significant contributions to the making of Air Force history to **Maj. Gen. John R. Alison**, USAFR (Ret.), a member of the World War II Flying Tigers and of the Air Commandos.

The second annual **Major General I. B. Holley Award** for sustained, significant contributions to the research, interpretation, and documentation of Air Force history to **Brig. Gen. Alfred F. Hurley**, USAF (Ret.), PhD, who was a long-time chair of the U.S. Air Force Academy’s Department of History and who recently retired as long-time President of the University of North Texas System.

The Foundation also will present its **Air Power History “Best Article Award”** to **Lt. Col. Donald R. Baucom**, USAF (Ret.), PhD, for his two-part series, “Wakes of War: Contrails and the Rise of Air Power, 1918-1945,” in *Air Power History*, Summer and Fall 2007 issues.


**SCHEDULE AND FEES:** The awards banquet will be preceded by two events:


A **reception at 6:00 pm prior to the banquet at 7:00 pm**

- Military and active civil service (any service, any nation): $40
- Members, Air Force Historical Foundation other than above: $50
- All others: $60

**WHO MAY ATTEND:** Anyone who wants to attend may register online at www.afhistoricalfoundation.org. Membership in the Foundation is not required.

**DRESS:** Business attire or service dress. Military may wear utility uniform (flight suit or BDUs) if more convenient.

**CORPORATE SPONSORSHIPS:** Sponsorships are available for corporate tables and for the reception.

**REGISTRATION AND MORE INFORMATION:** Registration is live online at www.afhistoricalfoundation.org.

**CONTACT:** Tom Bradley, Executive Director, Air Force Historical Foundation, (301) 736-1959, execdir@afhistoricalfoundation.org.
Section 4 Officers: So Many Generals Among Them


We were advanced flight instructors at Kelly Field graduating in March 1941 in the Class of 41B. Col. Hubert R. Harmon commanded Kelly. Now deceased, he went on to become a major general. His assistant commandant was Lt. Col. Isaiah Davies, who rose to brigadier general. On at least three occasions in 1941 and 1942, Colonel Davies was the flight leader of 72 AT-6 and BC-1 aircraft in one formation. His pilots were section chiefs, operations officers, echelon commanders, and instructors. Davies and the four chiefs conducted “pass in reviews” over the Taj for the retirement of Air Corps general officers. Takeoffs and landings were in formation toward the South, on the sod of Kelly Field, with thirty-six aircraft passing on each side of the Kelly water tower for landings.

The first one of these flown by us was at least interesting, but as a wingman all one needed to do was “tuck in” really close for thirty to forty minutes; we could all do that very well. Moreover, we were all well briefed by our echelon commanders.

Section IV Flight Instructors, Summer 1941.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank at Retirement</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 1941</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section Chief</td>
<td>Maj. William L. Kennedy</td>
<td>major general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ops officer</td>
<td>Capt. Willis F. Chapman</td>
<td>brigadier general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comdr 1st Echelon</td>
<td>1st Lt. John D. Ryan</td>
<td>general (chief of staff)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comdr 2d Echelon</td>
<td>1st Lt. James H. Isbell</td>
<td>brigadier general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flt instructor</td>
<td>2d Lt. Timothy F. O'Keefe</td>
<td>general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1941</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section Chief</td>
<td>Capt. Willis F. Chapman</td>
<td>as above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ops officer</td>
<td>1st Lt. John D. Ryan</td>
<td>as above</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comdr 1st Echelon</td>
<td>1st Lt. V.L. Zoller</td>
<td>brigadier general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comdr 2d Echelon</td>
<td>1st Lt. L.P. Egger</td>
<td>not listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flt instructor</td>
<td>2d Lt. Timothy F. O'Keefe</td>
<td>as above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flt instructor</td>
<td>2d Lt. John L. Martin</td>
<td>major general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flt instructor</td>
<td>2d Lt. David V. Miller</td>
<td>major general</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Letters

Hughes' Falcon

I enjoyed the excellent article by Thomas Wildenberg [Air Power History, Vol. 55, No. 2], and the insight it provided into the development of the Falcon missile and the all-weather USAF interceptor fire control systems by Hughes. However, Table I omitted several items in the armament of the F–102A and F–106A. Many late models of the F–102A equipped with the MG-10 were modified to carry the AIM-26A nuclear version of the Falcon (which resulted in the elimination of the 2.75 FFAR) in addition to the other AIM-4s mentioned. Also, all F–106A were designed to carry the same MB-1 Genie nuclear rocket as carried the M-61 20mm Vulcan cannon “Six Shooter” on the belly could not.

Barry A. Miller, Lt. Col., USAF (Ret), Poquoson, Virginia.

Author's reply: "The operative words are 'late models were modified.'"

Who Are the Men in the Photo?

Ed. Several readers asked for the names of the men pictured on the cover of the Summer 2007 issue of Air Power History. The caption, printed on the bottom of page 1, identified them as members of the 86th Contingency Response Group who air-dropped on Bashur Airfield, Iraq, and began aerial port operations for the 173d Airborne Brigade to stabilize northern Iraq. They are: 

TSgt. Robert E. Hoyt, Security
MSgt. William K. Maus, Fuels
TSgt. Chet M. Kelley, Civil Engineering
SSgt. Ace W. Jones, Security
1Lt. Jarrett S. Lee, Intelligence
MSgt. Charles A. Cremeans, Medical
SSgt. Larry R. Knoll, Security
SSgt. Frank W. Zeintek, Security
SSgt. Damain G. Spaits, Security
SSgt. Franklin M. Barnett, Security
SSgt. Joshua W. Braune, Mobile Aerial Port
SSgt. Jefferey R. Scott, Security
SMSgt. Christopher Batta, Security
Capt. Michael A. Evancic, OIC, Logistics
Maj. Erik K. Rundquist, Cmdr, 786 SFS

They are: 

The Swoose Comes Home to Roost

The oldest surviving B–17 Flying Fortress was transferred from the Smithsonian to the National Museum of the U.S. Air Force. The bomber, originally nicknamed Ole Betsy, flew on the first combat mission in the Philippines only hours after the surprise attack against Pearl Harbor. Ole Betsy operated over the Southwest Pacific, mounting strikes from Australia, the Philippines and Java. In January 1942, during a bombing mission, enemy fighters damaged Old Betsy. The aircraft was repaired and overhauled with a replacement tail and engines from other B–17s, and a tail gun was added. Its pilot renamed it after a popular song of the time about a bird that was half-swan, half-goose—The Swoose. Later, Gen. George Brett, commander of Allied air forces in the Southwest Pacific, used it as his personal aircraft. On some flights, the crew had to man the guns to fend off enemy attack. After The Swoose returned to the U.S., it served as a high-speed transport until the end of the war.

The 509th Bomb Wing will hold a reunion September 22-25, 2008, in San Antonio, Texas. Contact:
Bob Baker
2912 Rock Barn Drive
San Antonio, TX 78216
(210) 315-5551
e-mail: bakerbarbo@aol.com

B-47 Stratojet Association will hold a reunion September 25-27, 2008, in Marietta, Georgia. Anyone associated with or interested in the B-47 is cordially invited. Contact:
Bob Bowman
(703) 826-5562
e-mail: bbowman@northhighland.com
webpage: www.B-47.com

The 59th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron (Goose Bay) will hold a reunion September 24-28, 2008, in Covington, Kentucky. Contact:
Bob Baker
2912 Rock Barn Drive
San Antonio, TX 78216
(210) 315-5551
e-mail: bakerbarbo@aol.com

The Rocky Mountain High meeting of the Silver Wings Fraternity and the Powder Puff Derby will be held at the Clarion Hotel—Denver-South, Colorado September 15-19, 2008. Contact:
Harry Blout (719) 495-2432
e-mail: harblount@yahoo.com or Barbara Evans (925) 687-1912
e-mail: qualit@aol.com

The C-7A Caribou Association will hold a reunion, September 29-October 3, 2008, in Dayton, Ohio. Contact:
Bill Buesking
(210) 403-2655
e-mail: wbuesking@satx.it.com

The 509th Bomb Wing will hold a reunion September 22-25, 2008, in San Antonio, Texas. Contact:
Tom Benagh
222 Bluff Hollow
San Antonio, TX 78216
(210) 402-3837
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(210) 315-5551
e-mail: bakerbarbo@aol.com

The 390th SMW, Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ (Titan II) will hold a reunion September 25-28, 2008, in Tucson, Arizona. Contact:
Elaine Lasher
PO Box 17916
Tucson, AZ 85731
(520) 886-7157
e-mail: redsnooty@comcast.net
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webpage: www.B-47.com

The 341 SMW/MW/SW Operations will hold a reunion September 12-14, 2008, in Great Falls, Montana. Contact:
Gerald Campos (410) 519-4369
e-mail: gdcampmoseverson.net

The 11th Radio Relay Squadron (in Europe) will hold a reunion September 15-17, 2008, in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Contact:
John Seifert
(410) 833-0672 or (800) 872-2529
e-mail: tbenagh@sbglobal.net

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John Seifert
(410) 833-0672 or (800) 872-2529
e-mail: bristolboy@peoplepc.com

The Air Rescue Association will hold a reunion September 17-20, 2008, in San Antonio, Texas. Contact:
Sandy Gonzalez (407) 834-0105
e-mail: sgonzales2@cfl.rr.com or Marilyn Nicholas (316) 866-0490
e-mail: mnnicholas@cox.com
The 3rd International Combat Camera Association will hold a conference/reunion in Las Vegas, Nevada, October 1-3, 2008. The theme is “Tempt Fate in 08” and will focus on the impact combat photography has on telling the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps story. Topics include the future of Combat Camera as a supporting capability of Strategic Communication, impact of photograph and video imagery during battles in Iraq, and the story of the only combat photographer to win the Medal of Honor. Contact:
Bruce Bender
e-mail: brucelender@juno.com
www.combatcamera.org/temptfate08.php

The Association of Air Force Missleers will hold a reunion, October 9-13, 2008, at the Hyatt Dulles, Herndon, Virginia. Contact:
AAFM
PO BOX 5693
Breckenridge, CO 80424
www.afmisseers.org

The 19th Air Refueling Squadron (SAC), Homestead and Otis AFBs, will hold a reunion October 12-15, 2008, at the Marriott River Walk Hotel in San Antonio, Texas. Contact:
Frank Szemere
(850) 862-4279
e-mail: fszemere@gmt.net

Strategic Air Command Airborne Command and Control Association (SAC ACCA) will hold a reunion October 15-19, 2008, in Dayton, Ohio. Contact:
Wilton Curtis
(804) 740-2290
e-mail: Wcurtis135@aol.com or
Steve Leazer
(760) 367-7631
e-mail: leaezer@thegrid.net

USAF Pilot Training Class 52-F will hold a reunion October 22-25, 2008, in Beach City, Texas. Contact:
W. R. Dusembury
9063 Northpoint Drive
Beach City Texas 77520
(281) 303-0085
e-mail: billduse@taleshare.net

Pilot Class 43-K will hold a reunion October 22-26, 2008, in Nashville, Tennessee. Contact:
Hal Jacobs
(707) 426-4959
e-mail: jakes43k@aol.com

Now available from the Air Force History and Museums Program
Look for them at www.gpo.gov
Robert C. Seamans, Jr.
1918-2008

Robert C. Seamans, Jr., the ninth Secretary of the United States Air Force died June 28, 2008, at his home in Beverly Farms, Massachusetts, following a heart attack. He served as secretary from February 1969 to May 1973, a tumultuous period in Air Force history that included the Vietnam War with its personnel issues involving low reenlistment rates, widespread drug abuse, the antiwar movement, weapons systems modernization, and cost overruns. An authority on guidance and flight control systems for both missiles and spacecraft, Dr. Seamans would use those skills in various managerial positions within and outside the government to include the deputy administrator at the National Air and Space Administration (NASA) during the mid-1960s.

Robert Channing Seamans, Jr. was born on October 30, 1918, in Salem, Massachusetts. After attending school in Lenox, Massachusetts, he earned a BS degree in engineering at Harvard University in 1939, an MS in aeronautics at MIT in 1942, and a doctorate in instrumentation, also from MIT, in 1951.

From 1941 to 1955, Dr. Seamans held teaching and project-management positions at MIT where he worked on aeronautical problems, including instrumentation and control of airplanes and missiles. Between 1948 to 1959, he served on technical committees of NASA’s predecessor organization, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. He served as a consultant to the USAF Scientific Advisory Board from 1957 to 1959, as a member of the board from 1959 to 1962, and as associate advisor from 1962 to 1967.

He joined the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) in 1955 as manager of the Airborne Systems Laboratory and Chief Systems Engineer of the Airborne Systems Department located in Boston, Massachusetts. In 1958 he became Chief Engineer of the Missile Electronics and Controls Division at RCA in Burlington, Massachusetts.

In 1960, Dr. Seamans joined NASA as Associate Administrator with responsibilities for research and development programs, field laboratories, assembling and launching facilities, and a worldwide network of tracking stations. From December 1965, until January 1968, he was Deputy Administrator of NASA retaining many of the management responsibilities of his prior position. Much of the development of the space program from completion of Project Mercury through Projects Gemini and Apollo, were approved and put into effect during his tenure.

While at NASA, Dr. Seamans also worked closely with the Department of Defense (DoD) in research and engineering programs and served as Co-chairman of the Astronautics Coordinating Board. Through these associations, NASA was kept abreast of military developments and technical needs of the DoD and DoD was informed of NASA activities with application to national security.

In January 1968, Seamans decided to leave NASA because the planning for Apollo has been done and he wanted to think ahead to what he would do for the remaining fifteen years of his professional life. In July, he was appointed to the Jerome C. Hunsaker chair, an MIT-endowed visiting professorship in the Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics. During this period he also served as a consultant to the Administrator of NASA.

Having received little forewarning that he would be selected as Air Force secretary, Seamans sold his house in Washington, D.C., a few days prior to accepting the position. With his confirmation in 1969, he joined a burgeoning elite of government and industry scientist-administrators. At the beginning of his term, Seamans saw that the Air Force needed to modernize, but at the least expensive possible. Consequently, he stressed the need for greater and more efficient management controls. He believed the Air Force had to phase in programs in such ways as to avoid excessive budget demands. However, while it was impossible to predict future threats or the technological innovations that would be required, Seamans argued that the Air Force should provide development options from which to select necessary procurement programs.
One issue that caused some controversy during his tenure was his testimony before Congress that he had no knowledge of the bombings of 1969 and 1970 in Cambodia; a statement sharply questioned by the press and Congress. However, his testimony brought to light a larger issue—the fact that the Service Secretaries had been taken out of the direct line of command and control of strategic decisions by various DoD legislative reorganizations of the 1950s. These acts increased the power to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and its Deputies at the expense of those of the Service Secretaries.

Although Seamans had planned to stay with the Air Force for only two years, he informed Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird that he wished to extend his tour to complete or initiate several projects. He wanted to place the C–5 contract with Lockheed on a sound basis; resolve the F–111 cost and technical difficulties; move new programs such as the F–15, B–1, AWACS, A–X and F–5E to the point where the Air Force could be confident in its policy of “fly before buy”; and improve military and civilian personnel policies. Seaman’s willingness to stay on depended on the Nixon administration’s determination to terminate the war in Southeast Asia. Sea man’s decision to stay on delighted Laird, who praised the Air Force secretary for his progress in modernizing the forces, managing key weapons systems program, planning for personnel requirements, and undertaking important domestic action programs. Laird also credited Seamans for his meaningful role in working toward the administration’s policy of Vietnamization.

In May 1973, at the time of Seaman’s retirement to become president of the National Academy of Engineering, President Nixon praised him for his leadership and managerial ability directing the development of sophisticated new aircraft and missile systems. The President credited Seamans with keeping the Air Force modernization program costs close to projected estimates and from establishing and creating an environment in which people serving in the Air Force believed they could realize their potential.

Seamans headed the National Academy of Engineering until December 1974, when he became the first administrator of the new Energy Research and Development Administration. He returned to MIT in 1977 to serve as dean of its School of Engineering in 1978. In 1981, he was elected chairman of the board of the Aerospace Corporation. From 1977 to 1984, he was also the Henry Luce professor of environment and public policy at MIT, where he remained as a senior lecturer in aeronautics and astronautics. In 1996, Seaman published his autobiography, Aiming at Targets.

Dr. Seaman is survived by his wife of sixty-six years, Eugenia Merrill Seaman; five children: Katharine Padulo, Robert C. Seaman III, Joseph Seaman, and May Baldwin; his brother, Daniel Seaman; eleven grandchildren; and two great-grandchildren.

George M. Watson, Jr., Ph.D. Senior Historian, Air Force Historical Studies Office

Guidelines for Contributors

We seek quality articles—based on sound scholarship, perceptive analysis, and/or firsthand experience—which are well-written and attractively illustrated. The primary criterion is that the manuscript contributes to knowledge. Articles submitted to Air Power History must be original contributions and not be under consideration by any other publication at the same time. If a manuscript is under consideration by another publication, the author should clearly indicate this at the time of submission. Each submission must include an abstract—a statement of the article’s theme, its historical context, major subsidiary issues, and research sources. Abstracts should not be longer than one page.

Manuscripts should be submitted in triplicate, double-spaced throughout, and prepared according to the Chicago Manual of Style (University of Chicago Press). Use civilian dates and endnotes. Because submissions are evaluated anonymously, the author’s name should appear only on the title page. Authors should provide a separate page brief biographical details, to include institutional or professional affiliation and recent publications, for inclusion in the printed article. Pages, including those containing illustrations, diagrams or tables, should be numbered consecutively. Any figures and tables must be clearly produced ready for photographic reproduction. The source should be given below the table. Endnotes should be numbered consecutively through the article with a raised numeral corresponding to the list of notes placed at the end.

If an article is typed on a computer, the disk should be in IBM-PC compatible format and should accompany the manuscript. Preferred disk size is a 3 1/2-inch floppy, but any disk size can be utilized. Disks should be labelled with the name of the author, title of the article, and the software used. Most Word processors can be accommodated including WordPerfect and Microsoft Word. As a last resort, an ASCII text file can be used.

There is no standard length for articles, but 4,500-5,500 words is a general guide.

Manuscripts and editorial correspondence should be sent to Jacob Neufeld, Editor, c/o Air Power History, 11908 Gainsborough Rd., Potomac, MD 20854, e-mail: jneufeld@comcast.net.
A few readers looked askance at our Summer 2008 mystery photo. The picture was composed so that a twin-engined airplane, when viewed from the side and behind, appeared to be a single-engined craft. Our follow up photo, from Beech Aircraft Co., resolves this ambiguity. The plane is a Beech L–23 Twin Bonanza.

The L–23 series began as an Army version of the general aviation world’s Twin Bonanza built by Beech in Wichita, Kansas. The Twin Bonanza, which was also the plane’s official military name for several years, was deemed ideal for transporting high-ranking officers in field conditions like those found during the Korean War.


In May and June 1957, Britton was one of four Army captains who flew two L–23Ds from the Wichita factory to a base in Germany, with stops on the east coast and in Canada, Greenland, and Scotland. This long-distance marathon made them the first Army aviators to cross the Atlantic Ocean since the Air Force became an independent service in September 1947. The other pilots were John Goodrich, Daniel O’Hara, and Hubert Reed.

In 1958, when the Army initiated its practice of naming aircraft for Indian tribes, the Twin Bonanza name was dropped and the L–23 became the Seminole. By then, it was serving worldwide as a liaison aircraft and staff transport.

The Army continued the series with the L–23F, an entirely different aircraft type derived from the Beech Queen Air. When the Pentagon’s system for naming aircraft was revamped in 1962, all planes in the L–23 series became U–8s.

Our follow-up photo shows the very first military Twin Bonanza, a YL–23 (52-1801) with the “Y” prefix signifying a service-test prototype role. The aircraft is making a flight near Wichita in 1952. In the Korean War winter of 1952-1953 Army needs consumed virtually all of Beech’s Twin Bonanza manufacturing resources.

Of 33 people who entered our latest contest, five got it wrong, an unusually high number. Our winner is Richard Greene of Tucson, Arizona. Richard will receive a copy of *Hell Hawks: The Untold Story of the American Fighter Pilots Who Savaged Hitler’s Wehrmacht*, by Robert F. Dorr and Thomas D. Jones, a history of the 365th Fighter Group.

Okay, let’s try again. Can you identify this issue’s “What is it” aircraft? In response to several requests we’ve made it a little easier this time, but you must include the full designation of the aircraft.

Remember the rules, please:
1. Submit your entry on a postcard to Robert F. Dorr, 3411 Valewood Drive, Oakton VA 22124, or by e-mail to robert.f.dorr@cox.net.
2. Name the aircraft shown here. Include your postal mailing address and telephone number. It’s important that a phone number be included.
3. A winner, picked from among correct entries, will receive a copy of *Hell Hawks*.

This feature needs your help. Do you have a photo of a rare or little-known aircraft? We’ll return any photos provided for use here.